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Abstract:

There are several ways in which redistricting reform could in theory be achieved.
State legislatures could voluntarily cede control over district-drawing, courts
could invalidate especially egregious gerrymanders, or popular initiatives could
be launched to create redistricting commissions. However, thanks to the selfinterest of legislators as well as the Supreme Court’s unfortunate recent decisions
in Vieth v. Jubelirer and LULAC v. Perry, the redistricting initiative is now the
only realistic way to curb political gerrymandering.
This Article provides the first detailed empirical and normative examination of
redistricting initiatives. The Article begins by making the case for the popular
initiative in the redistricting context, and for the redistricting commission as a
solution to the problem of gerrymandering. Relying on extensive archival
research, it next analyzes all twelve redistricting initiatives that have taken place
over the course of American history, positing explanations for why each measure
succeeded or failed. Finally, the Article considers the twelve initiatives
holistically in order to determine what factors best account for the measures’
passage or rejection, and how proponents of redistricting reform can improve their
odds of success in the future. The Article’s main finding is that, contrary to the
academic conventional wisdom, the most important reason for redistricting
initiatives’ frequent failure is the strident opposition of the majority party in the
state legislature. Conversely, redistricting initiatives only succeed when some
factor—e.g. favorable national developments, the enthusiastic support of the
state’s media establishment, dissension between the majority party’s executive
branch officials and its legislators—defuses majority party opposition.

* J.D., 2006, Yale Law School; M.Phil, University of Cambridge, 2002; A.B., Harvard
University, 2001. My thanks are due above all to Heather Gerken, who initially suggested this
Article’s subject and supported me throughout the writing and revision process. I am also
grateful to Melissa Anderson, David Fontana, Owen Fiss, Nathaniel Persily, and Larry Solan for
reading earlier drafts of this Article and offering many helpful suggestions.
1

Nicholas Stephanopoulos

Reforming Redistricting: Why Popular Initiatives To Establish Redistricting
Commissions Succeed or Fail
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................ 3
I. THE CASE FOR THE REDISTRICTING INITIATIVE AND COMMISSION ............................................... 6
A. The Redistricting Initiative..................................................................................................... 7
B. The Redistricting Commission ............................................................................................. 10
II. THE TWELVE REDISTRICTING INITIATIVES ................................................................................ 17
A. Variables .............................................................................................................................. 18
B. Cases .................................................................................................................................... 20
1. Arkansas, 1936 (Succeeded)............................................................................................. 21
2. Oklahoma, 1960 (Failed) .................................................................................................. 23
3. Oklahoma, 1962 (Succeeded) ........................................................................................... 26
4. North Dakota, 1973 (Failed) ............................................................................................. 29
5. Colorado, 1974 (Succeeded)............................................................................................. 33
6. Ohio, 1981 (Failed)........................................................................................................... 35
7. California, 1982 (Failed)................................................................................................... 38
8. California, 1984 (Failed)................................................................................................... 41
9. California, 1990 (Failed)................................................................................................... 45
10. Arizona, 2000 (Succeeded)............................................................................................. 48
11. California, 2005 (Failed)................................................................................................. 52
12. Ohio, 2005 (Failed)......................................................................................................... 56
III. PATTERNS AND LESSONS.......................................................................................................... 59
A. Patterns in the Past .............................................................................................................. 59
B. Lessons for the Future.......................................................................................................... 66
C. Implications for the Academic Conventional Wisdom ......................................................... 69
CONCLUSION.................................................................................................................................. 72
APPENDIX A: FEATURES OF THE TWELVE REDISTRICTING INITIATIVES ......................................... 75
APPENDIX B: FACTORS IN REDISTRICTING INITIATIVES’ SUCCESS OR FAILURE ............................. 76

2

INTRODUCTION

Redistricting in America is rotten. Across the country, for elections of every level, district
lines are drawn in such a way that fundamental democratic values are subverted. Sometimes
districts take on bizarre shapes as legislators add and subtract people in order to assure a
particular political profile. Sometimes distinct political communities—say, rural farmers or
inner-city minorities—are split apart by district lines or merged with other very different
communities. Sometimes districts are blatantly skewed toward one party even though the state as
a whole is politically competitive. Sometimes, thanks to clever district-drawing, the distribution
of seats in a state legislature or congressional delegation has little correlation to a state’s overall
voting pattern. And, very often, all these sins are combined. When looking at a district map, it is
not unusual to see oddly shaped districts that divide political communities, virtually guarantee
reelection for incumbents, and enable one party to win a much higher proportion of legislative
seats than popular votes.
There are several ways in which redistricting abuses could be combated, but
unfortunately most are unlikely to transpire. Congress1 and state legislatures2 could pass laws

1

The Constitution explicitly states that “Congress may at any time by law make or alter . . . regulations” relating to
“[t]he times, places and manner of holding elections.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. Congress has exercised this authority
several times in the past. The Apportionment Act of 1842, 5 Stat. 491, required that House districts elect a single
member and consist of contiguous territory. The Apportionment Act of 1862, 12 Stat. 572, reiterated these
requirements, and the Apportionment Act of 1872, 17 Stat. 28, § 2, added the further condition that districts
“contain[] as nearly as practicable an equal number of inhabitants.” In 1901, Congress also insisted on district
compactness, Apportionment Act of 1901, 31 Stat. 733, and in 1911 it renewed these requirements of contiguity,
compactness, and equipopulation, Apportionment Act of 1911, 37 Stat. 13. However, Congress did not extend the
1911 requirements when they expired, and has failed to pass any new redistricting legislation over the past ninety
years. Today the only federal statutory limitation on redistricting is the requirement that all House districts elect a
single member. 2 U.S.C. § 2c (2000).
2
Several states have either adopted standards for redistricting, or decided by statute to allow bipartisan or
nonpartisan commissions to draw district lines. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 25-2 (1993); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 721506 (1999); IOWA CODE § 42.4(5) (2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 1206 (2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 5-1-
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imposing certain requirements—e.g. contiguity, compactness, preservation of political
communities—on the district-drawing process. But legislators are the primary beneficiaries of
the redistricting status quo, and therefore have a strong incentive not to change the rules that
allow them to be reelected time after time. Courts could also intervene by invalidating especially
egregious gerrymanders. But the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Vieth v. Jubelirer3 and
League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry4 all but foreclosed federal judicial
relief, at least on equal protection grounds. A plurality of the Court held in Vieth (and affirmed in
LULAC) that political gerrymandering is never justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause, and
the remaining Justices splintered over what the constitutional standard should be (and whether it
has yet been discovered).5 As for state courts, Sam Hirsch has noted that it is “difficult to
convince [them] not to follow lockstep the U.S. Supreme Court’s . . . jurisprudence,” and that the
Elections Clause arguably “bars a state court from applying state constitutional law to invalidate
a congressional map enacted by the state legislature.”6
Legislators’ self-interest and adverse court decisions leave critics of contemporary
redistricting with only one promising avenue for reform: the popular initiative. The initiative,
available in some form in twenty-four states,7 enables the general public to place statutory and

115 (2003); WASH. REV. CODE § 44.05.090 (1994). But such states are in the minority, and their reforms typically do
not apply to federal elections.
3
541 U.S. 267 (2004).
4
126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006).
5
Justice Kennedy concurred in the Court’s judgment but wrote separately to express his view that simply because
“no [justiciable] standard has emerged in this case should not be taken to prove that none will emerge in the future.”
541 U.S. at 311 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment); see also LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2607 (“A plurality of the
Court in Vieth v. Jubelirer would have held such challenges to be nonjusticiable political questions, but a majority
declined to do so.”). The LULAC Court rejected yet another proposed standard for detecting unconstitutional
political gerrymandering, i.e. a presumption that mid-decade redistricting is conducted solely for partisan ends and
therefore violates the Equal Protection Clause.
6
Sam Hirsch, The United States House of Unrepresentatives: What Went Wrong in the Latest Round of
Congressional Redistricting, 2 ELECTION L.J. 179, 210-11 (2003).
7
See Initiative & Referendum Institute, State I &R, http://www.iandrinstitute.org/statewide_i%26r.htm (last visited
February 11, 2006). Forty-nine states (all but Delaware) require popular approval for constitutional amendments
passed by the legislature. Initiative & Referendum Institute, States with Legislative Referendum for Statutes and
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constitutional proposals directly on the ballot. After enough signatures are garnered, both
legislatures and courts are circumvented, and the people themselves are able to decide if, for
example, certain standards should be followed during redistricting or a commission should draw
district lines instead of the legislature.
Redistricting initiatives—in the wake of Vieth and LULAC the only realistic way to curb
political gerrymandering8—are the subject of this Article. Part I discusses the merits of the
initiative in the redistricting context, and evaluates the bipartisan commission (the approach
taken by almost every redistricting initiative) relative to other anti-gerrymandering mechanisms.
The section argues that the popular initiative is particularly well-suited to combating
gerrymandering because it allows voters to bypass the self-interested politicians who typically
thwart efforts to make redistricting fairer. The section also contends, on the basis of political
theory and empirical evidence, that the bipartisan commission is, on the whole, well-designed to
prevent gerrymandering and improve redistricting.
Part II begins to confronts the biggest problem with redistricting initiatives: the fact that
they generally fail. The section first presents a series of factors that have been identified by
scholars and other observers as potential explanations for initiatives’ success or failure. The
section then examines in detail the twelve cases in which initiatives were launched to regulate
redistricting. Each initiative’s official language, political backdrop, principal supporters and
opponents, campaign dynamics, and eventual outcome are described. In addition, tentative
conclusions are reached about why each initiative passed or (more typically) was defeated.

Constitutional Amendments, http://www.iandrinstitute.org/New%20IRI%20Website%20Info/Drop%20Down%
20Boxes/Requirements/Legislative%20Referendum%20States.pdf (last visited February 12, 2006).
8
Redistricting initiatives are clearly a second-best solution since they must be conducted separately in each state,
and are unavailable entirely in twenty-six states. It would be better to regulate gerrymandering across the entire
country in one swoop, either through congressional or federal judicial action. But, as argued above, national action is
virtually impossible because of federal legislators’ self-interest and unfavorable Supreme Court doctrine.
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Finally, Part III takes a more holistic approach to the twelve redistricting initiatives. The
section analyzes all the initiatives together in order to identify factors that were relevant to
success or failure across a range of cases; offers recommendations that advocates of redistricting
reform should follow in the future; and discusses the Article’s implications for the academic
conventional wisdom on why initiatives succeed or fail. The section’s main finding is that
redistricting initiatives always fail when they are strongly opposed by the majority party in the
state legislature, and only succeed when some factor—e.g. favorable national developments, the
enthusiastic support of the state’s media establishment, dissension between the majority party’s
executive branch officials and its legislators—defuses majority party opposition. The upshot for
reformers is that they should wait for auspicious political moments before launching redistricting
initiatives, and try at all costs to stop the majority party from presenting a unified front of
opposition to the measure. And the lesson for academics is that the traditional theory of initiative
outcomes, which downplays the importance of political parties, is wrong as applied to
redistricting initiatives. Not only do parties’ positions and campaigning influence redistricting
initiative outcomes, they hold more explanatory power than any other factor.

I. THE CASE FOR THE REDISTRICTING INITIATIVE AND COMMISSION

Before delving into the details of the twelve redistricting initiatives, it is important to ask
whether initiatives are a good idea in the redistricting context, and whether their typical
approach—the creation of a redistricting commission—is an appropriate cure for the ills of
gerrymandering. This Part argues that the answer to both of these questions is yes. Popular
initiatives are especially well-suited to the redistricting context because it is an area where

6

legislators’ self-interest often trumps the pursuit of the public good. And redistricting
commissions, while not a perfect solution to rampant political gerrymandering, are theoretically
and empirically superior to the status quo.

A. The Redistricting Initiative

When the initiative and referendum9 were first proposed at the turn of the twentieth
century, their supporters tended to view them as a panacea to many of the afflictions of politics.
Woodrow Wilson believed that they would remind politicians that “they are bound in duty . . . to
represent the sovereign people . . . and not the private interests which creep into their
counsels.”10 Harvard professor Lewis Jerome Johnson argued that, “[s]upplemented by the
initiative and referendum . . . the representative system will gradually but surely enter upon a
period of honor and usefulness hitherto never surpassed and probably never equaled.”11 And
California Governor Hiram Johnson, a prominent Progressive, claimed that after his state
adopted the initiative and referendum, “the prosperity of the State [would be] assured, exaction
and extortion from the people will be at an end,” and “development and progress will follow as a
matter of course.”12
But the century in which they have been in use has stripped some of the bloom off the
initiative and referendum rose. According to critics, the expense of placing a proposition on the
9

Initiatives are placed directly on the ballot after enough signatures are obtained. Referenda subject a legislative
enactment to a popular vote.
10
Woodrow Wilson, The Issues of Reform, in THE INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM AND RECALL 69, 87-88 (William
Bennett Munro ed., 1912).
11
Lewis Jerome Johnson, Direct Legislation as an Ally of Representative Government, in THE INITIATIVE,
REFERENDUM AND RECALL, supra note 10, at 139, 147.
12
Hiram Johnson, Inaugural Address (Jan. 3, 1911), available at http://www.governor.ca.gov/govsite/govsgallery
/h/documents/inaugural_23.html.
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ballot and then conducting an effective campaign for it makes it difficult for ordinary people to
participate in the initiative and referendum process, and results in domination by well-heeled
special interests.13 In addition, precisely because they evade the normal checks and balances of
the legislative process, initiatives and referenda can more easily be used to abridge individual
rights. As Julian Eule writes, “direct democracy bypasses internal safeguards designed to filter
out or negate factionalism, prejudice, tyranny, and self-interest.”14 Furthermore, initiatives and
referenda may result in an undesirable distortion of public policy. “The legislative process
provides for debate over alternatives, compromise, and consensus or agreement,” while
initiatives and referenda present voters with a single proposition that must be approved or
rejected in its entirety.15 Finally, the evidence that initiatives and referenda improve deliberation
on important issues is slim. In fact, voter turnout is usually far lower in special elections for
initiatives and referenda than in normal elections.
Fortunately, this critique of direct democracy has limited force in the redistricting
context. Redistricting initiatives do not endanger individual rights since all they seek to do is
change the process by which electoral district lines are drawn. They do not interfere with the
complicated negotiating and favor-trading of the legislative process since they involve no serious
spending and need not be balanced against other agenda items. Because of their diffuse impact
and fiscally neutral posture, there is no special interest group that consistently benefits from the
passage of redistricting initiatives. And, while not as simple and provocative as some cultural

13

See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett, Money, Agenda Setting, and Direct Democracy, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1845, 1853 (1999)
(“As money becomes the only certain route to ballot access, the character of direct democracy is increasingly
determined by those with financial resources.”); Jamin B. Raskin, Direct Democracy, Corporate Power and Judicial
Review of Popularly-Enacted Campaign Finance Reform, 1 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 21, 22 (1997)
(“[W]hether our laws emerge from legislative process or plebiscite, far too many of them are being shaped and
determined by the expenditure and contribution of huge sums of money by interested corporate factions.”).
14
Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1549 (1990).
15
DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 29 (1984).
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issues, the question of who should draw district lines—the legislature or a commission—is easily
understandable by voters.
Most importantly, redistricting initiatives are attractive because, to use John Hart Ely’s
phrase, they promise to “unblock[] stoppages in the democratic process.”16 Redistricting is a
context in which legislators’ incentives and the public interest are almost diametrically opposed.
Legislators want to win reelection handily and to have their party obtain as many seats as
possible. Under almost any theory of democracy, on the other hand, the public is more interested
in elections whose outcome is not a foregone conclusion, districts that respect preexisting
political communities, and legislatures whose partisan composition roughly reflects actual vote
totals. Redistricting initiatives enable the public to rescue their interests from legislative
hijacking. Substantive standards (e.g. contiguity, compactness, competitiveness, preservation of
political communities) can be imposed on redistricting, or a more neutral district-drawing
process instituted, without legislators—whose rejection of such proposals is a virtual certainty—
having anything to say about the matter. As a recent Harvard Law Review Note observes, direct
democracy, when it addresses flaws in the electoral and legislative process,

is playing precisely the role that it should: it checks dysfunctional government. . . . [D]irect
democracy is most effective when partisan politics or special-interest influence has so distorted the
proper operation of political markets that democratic government ceases to be responsive to
voters’ concerns. Just as scholars have advocated an enhanced judicial role when “the ins are
choking off the channels of political change to ensure that they will stay in and the outs will stay
out,” so too can direct democracy promote more responsive and representative government in such
situations.17

Redistricting initiatives are by no means without their blemishes. As Part II discusses in
detail, voters are not always very informed or excited about them, their accompanying media
16

JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 117 (1980).
Note, Judicial Approaches to Direct Democracy, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2748, 2764-65 (2005) (internal citations
omitted).
17
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campaigns are often extremely misleading, and sinister motives are sometimes alleged to lurk
behind the proposals’ technical details. Moreover, the intrinsic state-by-state nature of direct
democracy means that redistricting reform by initiative must unfold slowly and incrementally,
rather than in a single national legislative or judicial thunderclap. Still, on balance, the case for
redistricting initiatives is strong. Unlike many other initiatives, they do not supplicate to special
interests, upset delicate budgetary balances, or harm minority groups. And, as long as legislative
and judicial paths to reform remain blocked, they represent the only realistic way for the evils of
gerrymandering to be redressed.

B. The Redistricting Commission

Redistricting initiatives could in principle operate in several ways. They could allow the
legislature to continue drawing districts, but require that certain rules about districts’ shape and
composition be followed. They could abolish single-member districts entirely and replace them
with a proportional representation or other electoral system.18 They could create a nonpartisan or
bipartisan commission and grant it complete freedom to devise the district map it thinks is best.
Or they could create a commission and limit its discretion by imposing various requirements on
the districts that it draws.
In practice, every one of the twelve redistricting initiatives has taken the last of these
approaches: establishing a commission by constitutional amendment, and then providing the
commission with various rules to follow as it goes about drawing district lines. The main
contrasts among the initiatives have involved the bodies to be reapportioned (state legislature
18

This would only be possible for state elections. Federal law requires that all Representatives be elected through
single-member districts. 2 U.S.C. § 2c (2000).
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and/or congressional delegation), the standards to be used by the commissions, and the size,
composition, and selection of the commissions. Appendix A, infra, summarizes the main features
of the twelve redistricting initiatives.
Because the initiatives have been so similar, it is worth examining how compelling their
solution to political gerrymandering—a commission with prescribed standards—is. In my view,
the commission is quite a good solution.19 First, and most critically, the members of redistricting
commissions are not self-interested legislators. Who exactly the members are varies from
initiative to initiative,20 but in no case are the very politicians who will soon be running for
reelection allowed to draw the district lines themselves. This feature of commissions encourages
values other than the legislators’ self-interest to be pursued, for example, district
competitiveness, the preservation of political communities, and the achievement of electoral
results that broadly mirror the public’s political preferences.21 Of course, commission members
are not politically agnostic saints; under the terms of several of the twelve initiatives, in fact, they
may be executive branch officials or staunch partisans appointed by state party leaders. But the
fact that commission members’ own careers will not be directly affected by the district maps that
they draw frees them to focus on the public good (or, at least, to consider it more seriously than

19

Redistricting commissions enjoy wide support in the scholarly literature. See, e.g., DENNIS F. THOMPSON, JUST
ELECTIONS: CREATING A FAIR ELECTORAL PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES 173-75 (2002); Christopher C. Confer,
To Be About the People’s Business: An Examination of the Utility of Nonpolitical/Bipartisan Legislative
Redistricting Commissions, 13 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 115 (2004); Robinson O. Everett, Lessons from North
Carolina’s Redistricting Litigation, 6 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 205, 221 (2001); Samuel Issacharoff, Judging Politics:
The Elusive Quest for Judicial Review of Political Fairness, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1643, 1647, 1691-98 (1993); Gene R.
Nichol, The Practice of Redistricting, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 1029, 1030 (2001); Jeffrey C. Kubin, Note, The Case for
Redistricting Commissions, 75 TEX. L. REV. 837 (1997).
20
See infra Appendix A. The three principal formulas for commission composition are 1) for certain state officials
(e.g. the governor, the secretary of state) to be on the commission ex officio; 2) for designated state officials (e.g. the
governor, legislature majority and minority leaders, state party leaders) to appoint the commission members; and 3)
for retired judges to staff the commission.
21
See Nichol, supra note 19, at 1030 (“I am inclined to believe that independent redistricting commissions are less
political than their legislative counterparts.”); Kubin, supra note 19, at 858 (“The legislative independence of . . .
commissioners also affords them greater flexibility to adhere to a state's constitutionally mandated redistricting
criteria.”).
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legislators do). The bipartisan nature of many commissions, with an equal number of each major
party’s backers as well as, typically, a neutral chairperson elected by the political appointees,22
also prevents commission members from blatantly flouting democratic values. Any redistricting
proposal that promises to result in disproportionate electoral success for one party inevitably
provokes fierce opposition from the other party’s supporters and the chairperson.23
Second, redistricting that is conducted by a commission enjoys greater public legitimacy
than redistricting carried out by the state legislature. As Jeffrey Kubin notes, the latter method
“fosters disillusionment with the democratic process because it more deeply ingrains upon the
American psyche the image of politicians as self-interested actors feathering their own nests.”24
Oddly shaped districts, very high reelection rates, seat counts that do not correspond to vote
counts—all these ills may be blamed on self-serving politicians when the legislature draws the
district lines, with the result that the public’s faith in government declines and its cynicism
swells. In contrast, when elections conducted pursuant to a commission’s district map fall short
of perfection, people at least know that the rules of the game were drafted by someone other than
the game’s actual contestants.25
Third, entrusting redistricting to a commission allows the legislature to devote more
attention to issues of greater concern to the public. It is true that redistricting (typically) takes
place only once per decade, but it is a very time-consuming process that generates a great deal of
animosity among legislators battling for personal and partisan advantage. A governor’s veto or a

22

A variation of this formula was proposed in North Dakota (1973), Arizona (2000), and Ohio (2005). Many states
that have adopted redistricting commissions through legislative action (as opposed to an initiative) also have
bipartisan commissions.
23
See Kubin, supra note 19, at 856 (“Fundamentally, tie-breaking commissions provide for a fair fight because the
majority party cannot run roughshod over the minority party as it would be able to in an unevenly split legislature.”).
24
Id. at 860.
25
See Confer, supra note 19, at 126 (“Bipartisan or nonpartisan legislative redistricting commissions increase the
legitimacy of the entire redistricting process by removing the most self-interested group, the political parties, from
control over the process.”).
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court’s invalidation of the legislature’s plan, both quite common in the redistricting context, can
further protract the process and intensify legislators’ antagonism. But when a commission draws
district lines, both the time-drain and the poisonous side effects of legislative redistricting are
averted.26
Empirical evidence confirms that elections in states with commissions are superior in
several respects to elections in states without commissions.27 Andrew Gelman and Gary King
conducted a study of all lower house elections in thirty states over a twenty-year period. They
found that when a single party controls redistricting, it wins on average three percent more seats
than it would have obtained if a commission handled redistricting or if control over the
legislature was split.28 That is, a party that would have won 100 seats under a bipartisan
commission’s plan will typically win 103 seats if it is able to draw the district lines itself. At the
federal level, I compared 2004 election results in the four states that employ redistricting
commissions and have more than two congressional seats—Arizona, Iowa, New Jersey, and
Washington—to results in the forty-three states that do not use commissions to redistrict their
congressional delegations.29 I found that candidates’ average margin of victory was smaller in
the commission states than the non-commission states (30.0% versus 36.6%), election turnout

26

See id. at 128 (“The primary advantage gained by allowing redistricting to be done by nonpolitical or bipartisan
redistricting commissions is that the legislature can take the time previously spent on redistricting and spend it in
pursuit of its primary responsibility - being about the people's business.”).
27
See also Christopher S. Elmendorf, Representation Reinforcement Through Advisory Commissions: The Case of
Election Law, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1366, 1388 (2005) (noting that redistricting commissions have been “singularly
effective”); id. at 1390 (“Many districting commissions that purport to be nonpartisan have acquired a reputation
(among informed local observers) for fulfilling their mission with integrity.”).
28
Andrew Gelman & Gary King, Enhancing Democracy Through Legislative Redistricting, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
541, 553 (1994).
29
I did not consider the three states that use commissions but have only one or two congressional seats (i.e. Hawaii,
Idaho, and Montana) because it is impossible to draw any conclusions about elections in such a small number of
districts. It should also be noted that Iowa’s commission is technically advisory only, but its proposals have almost
always been followed by the Iowa legislature.
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was higher (59.9% versus 57.7%), and the divergence between a major party’s proportion of
votes and its proportion of congressional seats was smaller (10.5% versus 16.2%).30
Redistricting plans drafted by commissions are also less likely to be challenged in court,
and more likely to be upheld when they are challenged. Christopher Confer analyzed lawsuits
involving the district maps of the seven states—Arkansas, Colorado, Michigan, Missouri, New
Jersey, Ohio, and Pennsylvania—that use commissions for state legislature redistricting but not
for congressional redistricting. He found that, after the 1980 census, five of the seven
congressional plans were invalidated but none of the state plans were struck down (and only two
were even litigated).31 After the 1990 census, similarly, two of the seven congressional plans
were declared invalid while only one state plan was (and that state plan, for the Arkansas state
legislature, was the product of a commission composed solely of executive branch officials).32
As for the four states that employ commissions for both state and federal redistricting, the 1980
and 1990 cycles together saw only one state plan and one federal plan invalidated.33 Elections
carried out after redistricting by a commission, then, appear to result in less litigation, a tighter
correlation between a party’s vote and seat totals, and, at least at the federal level, more voter
participation and more competitive races.
Like redistricting initiatives, redistricting commissions are far from flawless. If party
representation on a commission is unbalanced, as is the case in several states, the commission
may be just as dominated by partisan self-interest as the state legislature. Even if the commission

30

For 2004 election data, see Fairvote, Voting and Democracy Research, Dubious Democracy 2005 Data,
http://www.fairvote.org/?page=722 (last visited February 16, 2006). Because of the small number of commission
states, none of the differences between commission and non-commission states are significant at the 95% confidence
level. The probability that the differences did not arise due to chance are 88% for the average margin of victory,
35% for turnout, 85% for Democrat seat-to-vote divergence, and 73% for Republican seat-to-vote divergence.
31
Confer, supra note 19, at 132. If anything, one would expect state legislature redistricting maps to be more likely
to be invalidated because of the far greater number of seats involved.
32
Id.
33
Id. at 131.
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has an equal number of supporters of each major party, the outcome of the redistricting process
may be a “sweetheart gerrymander,” where parties’ seats correspond to their support among
voters but districts are drawn in such a way that incumbents coast effortlessly to victory.
Furthermore, the near impossibility after Vieth and LULAC of challenging redistricting plans on
partisan gerrymandering grounds means that there is no effective judicial check on commissions’
actions.34 If they disregard the specified redistricting criteria, or create a district map as flawed as
that of any legislature, there is very little that the courts can do.35 Finally, some critics argue that
even if commissions “work”—by making elections more competitive and legislative power more
proportional to voter support—this is not necessarily a good thing.36 More competition may
undermine party cohesion by weakening party leaders’ hold on their seats and prompting
candidates in close races to deviate from the party line. And more proportional representation
may hamper the state majority party’s ability to pass legislation, and, at the congressional level,
hurt the national party that would otherwise have enjoyed a disproportionate majority of the
state’s seats.37
I do not find these arguments against redistricting commissions persuasive. The potential
negative consequences of unbalanced and bipartisan commissions are belied by the empirical
evidence cited above; even if such commissions in theory might produce gerrymanders of
34
Challenges to redistricting plans on racial gerrymandering grounds—both under the Equal Protection Clause and
the Voting Rights Act—remain available even after Vieth and LULAC.
35
For a rare example of a court striking down a commission plan for failure to follow all of the specified
redistricting criteria, see In re Apportionment of the Colorado General Assembly, 828 Pd. 185, 194-96 (Colo, 1992)
(upholding most of the Colorado commission’s 1990 legislative redistricting plan but invalidating the split of two
counties, which violated the requirement that counties not be unnecessarily divided).
36
See Confer, supra note 19, at 133-38.
37
For example, if California were to start redistricting by commission, its congressional delegation, currently made
up of 33 Democrats and 20 Republicans, would likely become more evenly split. This might be a “fairer” result, but
it would substantially harm the national Democratic Party. For a state to begin redistricting its congressional
delegation by commission in a context where most states do not, then, arguably amounts to unilateral disarmament.
See Adam B. Cox, Partisan Gerrymandering and Disaggregated Redistricting, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 409, 450 n.118
(2004) (“If [redistricting reforms] were successful in only a few states (or if there were a consistent partisan
alignment among the states most likely to enact such reforms by initiative), the use of commissions might
exacerbate certain harms.”).
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various sorts, in practice they have not tended to do so. Moreover, even if accurate, the critique
of unbalanced and bipartisan commissions proves only that commissions with a particular
composition do not function well—not that all commissions are intrinsically flawed. In
particular, a commission made up of nonpartisan experts, like the one used by Iowa, should
result in neither a one-party nor a bipartisan gerrymander.
As for the argument that rigorous judicial review of commissions’ actions is unavailable,
it merely suggests that there should be such judicial review. And in the absence of any way to
regulate partisan gerrymandering in the courts, it is even more important that an independent
party, not the self-interested legislators, draw the district lines. Samuel Issacharoff goes so far as
to contend that courts should not even try to “police redistricting outcomes ex post,” and instead
“should forbid ex ante the participation of self-interested insiders in the redistricting process.”38
Finally, it is true that greater electoral competition and more proportional representation are not
unalloyed goods; in the complex realm of elections, no goal can ever be achieved without some
compromise. The key point, though, is that competition and some rough measure of proportional
representation are far more fundamental to the democratic process than party cohesion and
legislative efficiency. Democracy is in part about unified parties and effective lawmaking—but
its essence is the translation of the popular will into public policy, and this deeper mission is
advanced by redistricting commissions and undermined by the status quo.

38

Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593, 643 (2002).
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II. THE TWELVE REDISTRICTING INITIATIVES

Redistricting commissions promise to improve American democracy, and the popular
initiative is an attractive way to establish commissions in states where the legislature refuses to
act. The great puzzle, then, is why most redistricting initiatives fail and why a select few
succeed.39 Solving this puzzle is critically important for proponents of redistricting reform, who
need to know when and where to launch initiatives, and under what circumstances to hold their
fire. The frequent failure and occasional success of redistricting initiatives are also perplexing to
legal scholars and political scientists, most of whom would expect such initiatives—in the
interests of the general public, and opposed mainly by self-interested legislators—generally to
prevail.40
This Part begins the effort to get to the bottom of the mystery. It first outlines a series of
factors that might explain redistricting initiatives’ success or failure. Some of these variables
have been identified by political scientists as significant in the initiative context, while others
emerged as important over the course of my research. The Part next describes the salient features
of the twelve redistricting initiatives that have taken place over the course of American history,
and offers some tentative explanations for why each initiative succeeded or failed.

39

Studies of why initiatives of a specific sort succeed or fail are rare. There are no studies of which I am aware
attempting to explain why redistricting initiatives succeed or fail.
40
Cf. RICH BRAUNSTEIN, INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM VOTING: GOVERNING THROUGH DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN THE
UNITED STATES 110 (2004) (presenting data that government and political process initiatives succeed at a higher rate
than any other type of initiative).

17

A. Variables

What are the variables that might explain the electoral success or failure of redistricting
initiatives? Several political scientists, first, have identified campaign spending as a critical
factor. According to Elizabeth Garrett, studies “have uniformly concluded that money plays a
large role in [initiative] campaigns, particularly when it is spent to defeat ballot questions.”41
Deep pockets allow politicians and interest groups to obtain access to the ballot—typically a
difficult task because of the large number of signatures required—and more effectively to
broadcast their message to the public. As a result, 78 percent of initiative campaigns are won by
the side that spends more money, and opponents of a measure who outspend its backers win 90
percent of the time.42 Second, some (more optimistic) scholars argue that initiatives’ outcomes
depend on voters’ appraisal of the proposals’ pros and cons. Rich Braunstein’s data indicates that
“inclusive” measures succeed at a higher rate than “exclusive” measures that primarily benefit a
particular interest group (65.5 percent versus 43.5 percent), and that measures that increase
citizens’ decision-making power succeed 73 percent of the time.43 Similarly, Andrew Skalaban’s
analysis of two California term limits initiatives suggests that voters have the “ability to make a
sophisticated choice between competing initiatives by voting for the one closest to their ideal and
against the other.”44

41

Garrett, supra note 13, at 1847.
BRAUNSTEIN, supra note 40, at 75-77; see also PHILIP L. DUBOIS & FLOYD FEENEY, LAWMAKING BY INITIATIVE:
ISSUES, OPTIONS, AND COMPARISONS 182-86 (1998) (46% of California initiatives with one-sided spending in favor
succeeded, and 90% of California initiatives with one-sided spending in opposition failed). Contra MAGLEBY, supra
note 13, at 147 (“By spending considerably more than the opposition, can a group pass an initiative into law? . . . .
The best available evidence indicates that this is typically not the case.”); John R. Owens & Larry L. Wade,
Campaign Spending on California Ballot Propositions, 1924-1984: Trends and Voting Effects, 39 W. POL. Q. 675,
688 (1986) (“Money has simply been overemphasized as a determinant of voting on direct legislation.”)
43
BRAUNSTEIN, supra note 40, at 55, 67.
44
Andrew Skalaban, The Mostly Sovereign People: Sophisticated Voting and Public Opinion About Term Limits in
California, 20 POL. BEHAVIOR 35, 47 (1998).
42
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Third, the positions taken by elites—major newspapers, interest groups, prominent
politicians, etc.—arguably affect the likelihood that an initiative will pass. Jeffrey Karp’s study
of a 1991 Washington term limits initiative showed that voters who were favorably disposed
toward House Speaker Tom Foley and who knew that he opposed the measure were far more
likely to oppose the measure themselves.45 James Gregg found that the electorate follows
newspapers’ endorsements more than 80 percent of the time,46 and David Magleby determined
that the positions of groups such as environmentalists and unions have a great deal of influence
on voters’ behavior (greater, in fact, than politicians’ stances).47 Finally, some scholars contend
that the framing of an initiative is critically important. David McCuan et al. interviewed political
consultants and found that, in the consultants’ view, the most important element of initiative
campaigns was the “drafting of messages designed to gain support or test likely objections for a
ballot measure.”48 Magleby, similarly, analyzed several California initiatives and concluded that
“[t]he battle over defining the proposition is one of the most important aspects of initiative
politics . . . [T]he side that defines the issue will win the election.”49
In addition to these factors, two variables that are not emphasized in the secondary
literature should be cited. First, the positions adopted by the major parties, and the intensity and

45

Jeffrey A. Karp, The Influence of Elite Endorsements in Initiative Campaigns, in CITIZENS AS LEGISLATORS:
DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 149, 162 (Shaun Bowler et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter CITIZENS AS
LEGISLATORS].
46
MAGLEBY, supra note 15, at 151 (citing the Gregg study); see also EDWARD C. BANFIELD & JAMES Q. WILSON,
CITY POLITICS 324 (1963) (“[W]hen voters must . . . pass on a multitude of referenda issues, the newspaper acquires
added influence.”). Contra John E. Mueller, Voting on the Propositions: Ballot Patterns and Historical Trends in
California, 63 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1197, 1211 (1969) (“This analysis of ballots has found little evidence to support
the view that newspaper recommendations strongly affect the vote on the propositions.”).
47
MAGLEBY, supra note 15, at 158-59; see also Thomas A. Henderson & Walter A. Rosenbaum, Prospects for
Consolidating Local Government: The Role of Elites in Electoral Outcomes, 17 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 695, 717 (1973)
(“The differing referendum outcomes [in two Florida referendums on local government consolidation] were
associated with contrasting elite attitudes and behaviors in the campaigns.”).
48
David McCuan et al., California’s Political Warriors: Campaign Professionals and the Initiative Process, in
CITIZENS AS LEGISLATORS, supra note 45, at 68.
49
MAGLEBY, supra note 15, at 168-69; see also Mueller, supra note 46, at 1211 (“[C]ampaigning . . . does seem to
structure opinion on those few propositions on which it is conducted . . . .”).
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consistency with which they are promoted, may have an impact on an initiative’s odds of
passing.50 Parties have significant resources, they can easily convey their message through the
politicians who belong to the party, and voters tend to respond to partisan cues. When a party
strongly supports or opposes a measure, then, its stance should be expected to have some effect
on the initiative’s fate. Second, major state and national developments may make a redistricting
initiative more or less likely to pass. A recent egregious gerrymander or a nationwide tide in
favor of electoral reform, for instance, may create a favorable climate for a redistricting
initiative. On the other hand, when voters are relatively satisfied with the political status quo,
they may be reluctant to try to fix what does not seem to be broken.

B. Cases

The factors that one might expect, on the basis of the secondary literature and common
sense, to influence a redistricting initiative’s likelihood of passing are therefore the following:
campaign spending; the initiative’s actual content and voters’ evaluation of its benefits and costs;
the positions taken by newspapers, politicians, interest groups, and political parties; the framing
of the initiative over the course of the campaign; and the presence or absence of important state

50

The typical view in the secondary literature is that parties do not often get involved in initiative campaigns, and
have little influence when they do get involved. See THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF
INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 67 (1989) (“The absence of party labels [in initiative elections] . . . denies a
majority of voters of a familiar cue.”); MAGLEBY, supra note 15, at 174 (“There are good reasons for political
parties to avoid stands on ballot measures.”); Elisabeth Gerber & Arthur Lupia, Campaign Competition and Policy
Responsiveness in Direct Political Behavior, 17 POL. BEHAVIOR 287, 290 (1995) (“[P]artisan cues are usually absent
in direct legislation elections.”); Richard L. Hasen, Parties Take the Initiative (and Vice Versa), 100 COLUM. L.
REV. 731, 731 (2000) (“The conventional wisdom is that the initiative process weakens the intermediary role of
political parties.”).
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or national developments. This Section takes these factors into account while describing the
twelve51 redistricting initiatives and evaluating why they each succeeded or failed.

1. Arkansas, 1936 (Succeeded)

The first ever redistricting initiative took place in Arkansas in 1936. The state legislature
had long been badly misapportioned, with Assembly and Senate districts varying widely in
population,52 and no reapportionment having taken place since 1890.53 In response, Amendment
No. 23 was placed on the 1936 general election ballot. The initiative sought to create a threemember Board of Apportionment to conduct redistricting, composed of the governor, the
secretary of state, and the attorney general. The Board would have no power to change Assembly
district lines, which were required to correspond to county boundaries, but would be able to vary
the number of representatives that each county received in accordance with its population.54 The
Board would actually have the authority to draw the thirty-five Senate districts, with the caveats

51

This Article does not consider the large number of initiatives that solely addressed misapportionment, for instance
by requiring all electoral districts to have approximately the same population. The Article only considers initiatives
that sought to create redistricting commissions and thereby combat political gerrymandering. This choice as to scope
was made because 1) the campaign over an initiative is quite different when the measure seeks to create equally
sized districts as opposed to when it tries to take redistricting out of legislators’ hands; and 2) more importantly,
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), and its progeny have wholly mooted the debate over whether equally sized
districts and one-person, one-vote are desirable. Pre-Baker initiatives are therefore examined only if they tried to
fight political gerrymandering in addition to legislative misapportionment.
52
See A Fair Deal for Every County, ARKANSAS GAZETTE, Oct. 22, 1936, at 1 [hereinafter A Fair Deal] (“While a
certain county with 44,740 population has one representative, two counties with a combined population of 43,262
have two representatives each, giving them together four times as many votes in the House of Representatives.”);
Inequality and Injustice, ARKANSAS GAZETTE, Oct. 23, 1936, at 1 (“The most glaring inequality of all is that
imposed on one three-county district with 126,918 population and one senator, as compared with another threecounty district whose population is 33,225.”).
53
See In Tuesday’s Election, ARKANSAS GAZETTE, Nov. 1, 1936, at 1.
54
All of Arkansas’s seventy-five counties are entitled to at least one Assembly representative. Since the Assembly
has one hundred seats, the Board has only twenty-five seats to distribute on the basis of county population.
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that counties could not be divided for any reason, non-contiguous counties could not be
combined, and all districts were required to have “as nearly as practicable” the same population.
The campaign over Amendment No. 23 was quite subdued, as the 1936 presidential race
and other ballot initiatives absorbed most of the attention of Arkansas’s politicians and media.
Democrat Governor Junius Futrell made no public statements about the reapportionment
initiative, nor did the state’s legislators hold rallies or raise money for or against the measure.
Newspaper coverage was also scant but largely supportive, with both the Arkansas Gazette55 and
the Arkansas Democrat56 strongly endorsing the measure. In one typical editorial, the Gazette
declared that “[a]pportionment is not a matter of one county or senatorial district or section
against another, but a matter of fairness and justice for every resident of Arkansas wherever he
lives.”57
On November 3, 1936, Amendment No. 23 passed by a vote of 66 percent for versus 34
percent against. The main reason for the measure’s success appears to have been a desire by the
electorate—sharpened by favorable newspaper editorials—to undo the legislature’s longstanding
misapportionment. In the absence of organized opposition, the policy arguments against
imbalances in legislative representation prevailed. Decisions by Arkansas courts after the
initiative’s passage confirm this assessment of why Amendment No. 23 succeeded. In the 1941
case of Bailey v. Abington, the Arkansas Supreme Court opined that “by the adoption of
Amendment No. 23, the people intended to correct certain evils that then existed,” namely the
situation where “some counties with a small population [had] more representatives than others

55

See A Fair Deal, supra note 52 (“Every county should of course have as many members as its population entitles
it to have . . . . Vote “For” Amendment No. [23].”)
56
See Amendment No. 25—Apportionment, ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT, Oct. 30, 1936, at 10 (“In the spirit of everyday
fairness to each other the voters should support Amendment No. [23].”).
57
See Fairness and Justice for All, ARKANSAS GAZETTE, Oct. 28., 1936, at 1.
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with a larger population.”58 In Stevens v. Faubus, similarly, the Court stated that “[i]t was
because the allocation [of legislators] had not been changed for many years and had become
inequitable that the voters declared in Amendment 23 that the apportionment must be adjusted
every ten years.”59 Importantly, partisan politics do not appear to have played a role in the
initiative campaign. Arkansas’s Democratic Party retained firm control of the state legislature
both before and after Amendment No. 23 passed, and no one could have expected the initiative
to challenge the party’s predominance in a state that since Reconstruction has been one of the
country’s least hospitable terrains for Republicans.

2. Oklahoma, 1960 (Failed)

Prior to 1960, the Oklahoma state legislature was one of the most misapportioned in the
country. An observer in the Western Political Quarterly noted that “[d]espite a continuing
urbanization, the Oklahoma legislature remains ridiculously overpopulated with rural
representatives,” with 27 percent of voters controlling a majority of the lower chamber’s seats
and 25 percent controlling a majority of the state senate.60 The state senator from Marshall and
Love Counties represented only 15,879 persons while the senator from Tulsa County represented
248,000.61 Moreover, this misapportionment existed in direct violation of the Oklahoma state
constitution, which required districts of roughly equal population and reapportionment after each
58

Bailey v. Abington, 148 S.W.2d 176, 180 (Ark. 1941).
Stevens v. Faubus, 354 S.W.2d 707, 710 (Ark. 1962); see also Butler v. Democrat State Committee, 160 S.W.2d
494, 496 (Ark. 1942) (“The purpose of the amendment was, of course, to secure equal and fair representation in the
General Assembly upon the basis of proportionate population.”).
60
Walter F. Scheffer, Problems in Municipal Finance, 15 W. POL. Q. 522, 525 (1962); see also George B. Merry,
Gerrymandering Lingers Across U.S., CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jun. 13, 1959, at 10 (noting that, in the 1958
congressional election, the Oklahoma Republican Party won just one of six seats despite receiving 31 percent of the
vote).
61
Jim Young, Reapportionment Poses One of State’s Stormiest Problems, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Apr. 3, 1960, at 83.
59
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census.62 The Oklahoma house of representatives had last been reapportioned in 1920, and the
Oklahoma senate had never been reapportioned in the state’s entire history.63
In 1960, both the state’s young Democratic governor, J. Howard Edmondson, and the
League of Women Voters, a national good government group, supported an initiative that would
have entrusted reapportionment to a three-member Legislative Apportionment Commission. The
commission, composed of the attorney general, the secretary of state, and the treasurer, would
have drawn state electoral districts of about the same population every ten years (with the caveat
that every county, no matter how small, would have been entitled to at least one representative in
the lower chamber).64 Governor Edmondson backed the measure out of frustration with the
rurally dominated legislature, which had refused to enact several policies that he favored. He
campaigned hard for redistricting reform, organizing a fifty-two member committee to rally
public opinion around the state,65 and delivering frequent speeches about the merits of the
proposal and the danger that federal courts would intervene if Oklahomans did not address their
legislature’s misapportionment.66 He was joined in support of the measure by major newspapers,
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See OKLA. CONST. art. 5, § 10 (repealed) (distributing House seats to counties based in part on their population
and requiring reapportionment every ten years); id. art. 5, § 9 (repealed) (same for Senate); see also James E.
Clayton, State Apportionment Pressure Mounts, WASH. POST, TIMES HERALD, Apr. 27, 1962, at A1 (“Under
Oklahoma’s constitution, its two largest counties are entitled to 15 of the 44 State Senators. They have three.”).
63
See Jim Young, Edmondson Reapportion Plan Lifts Ceiling, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 11, 1960, at 68.
64
See id. The League of Women Voters, while supportive of the initiative, would have preferred a plan that strictly
observed the principle of one-person, one-vote. See Apportion Petition Decision Looming, DAILY OKLAHOMAN,
Mar. 21, 1959, at 3 (“[S]ome of the league members thought [the governor’s] proposal was watered-down . . . .”);
Women Voters Keep Their Plan on Shelf, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Apr. 3, 1960, at 27 (“League leaders objected to the
governor’s plan to assure every county in the state at least one house member.”).
65
See Jim Reid, Forces Massing in Petition Fight, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Aug. 5, 1960, at 5; see also Fate of Reform
Issue Depends on Voting Size, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 18, 1960, at 1 (“[T]he Edmondson forces are putting on a
drive for personal contact with voters to get them to the polls.”).
66
See Federal Act Eyed in Apportionment, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 11, 1960, at 68 (quoting Gov. Edmondson)
(“[I]f we don’t take this action it is a grave probability that the federal government will do it for us . . . . It is a fair
assumption that unless we act and exercise our own rights we might well forfeit them.”); Young, supra note 63
(“Edmondson contends his petitions will simply give ‘fair representation to all of the people no matter what county
they live in.’”).
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city governments,67 civic groups such as the League of Women Voters, the Junior Chamber of
Commerce, and the Tulsa Jaycees,68 and the Oklahoma Republican Party, which was one of the
main victims of misapportionment.69
Ironically, opposition came almost entirely from within the governor’s own party.
Oklahoma Democrats, recognizing that redistricting reform would weaken their grip on the state
legislature, launched a furious campaign against the initiative. They formed a new organization,
Oklahomans for Local Government, to oppose the reapportionment measure as well as two other
ballot proposals that threatened rural interests.70 They argued that the state should retain its
existing constitutional reapportionment formula, rather than amend it so that there would be no
cap on the number of seats a county could have.71 They claimed that the initiative would allow a
small number of urban counties to dominate the state legislature and pass whatever laws they
wished.72 Most importantly, they systematically rallied rural voters through vigorous rhetoric,
frequent campaign events,73 and an organization extending all the way to the precinct level.74
In the end, the reapportionment initiative was defeated handily, by a vote of 35 percent in
favor versus 65 percent against. Only three of Oklahoma’s seventy-seven counties supported the
67

See Council Backs Reapportionment, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 14, 1960, at 4 (reporting that the Oklahoma City
Council passed a resolution in support of the reapportionment initiative, but only by a 5-3 vote).
68
See Otis Sullivant, Unity Is Sought on Legislative Apportion Plan, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 4, 1959, at 1.
69
See Harris Urges GOP Support for Petitions, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 13, 1960, at 17.
70
See Democrat Chiefs Fight Measures, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 8, 1960, at 11. Other groups opposing the
initiative—e.g. the Rural Electrification Commission, the Farmers Union and Farm Bureau, the Cattlemen’s
Association, and the County Officers Association—were also affiliated with the state Democratic Party and rural
interests.
71
The irony of Oklahoma Democrats defending the constitutional formula after failing to apply it for forty years in
the lower chamber’s case and ever in the senate’s case was pointed out by Daily Oklahoman editorials. See All the
People All the Time, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, July 3, 1960, at 10; What the Constitution Says, DAILY OKLAHOMAN,
Sept. 7, 1960, at 8 (“Actually the politicians who are hollering about the virtues of the constitutional formula have
no desire whatever to see it or any other reapportionment proposal applied. What they really favor is the undisturbed
status quo . . . .”).
72
See Anything But the Facts, Ma’am, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 8, 1960, at 14 (“The voters are being told that
‘three or four heavily populated counties’ will have enough legislative strength to pass any laws they please if
reapportionment passes September 20.”).
73
See Ray Parr, Governor Assailed at Petitions Rally, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 13, 1960, at 1 (describing a rally at
Tishomingo where former governor Raymond Gary denounced the reapportionment initiative).
74
See Reid, supra note 65.
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measure, while “[t]he one-sided majorities” in many rural counties “were the most lop-sided ever
given in the state on major issues.”75 The most important factor in the initiative’s defeat was the
intensity of opposition among the state Democratic Party and its rural backers, who rightly
feared that their political clout would be diminished if the initiative passed. Turnout was
extremely high—and voter sentiment almost uniformly negative—in rural counties, while city
dwellers turned out in smaller numbers and supported the initiative by less impressive
majorities.76 As the Daily Oklahoman remarked, “[r]ural voters were fanatically determined to
protect what they considered their interests,” while “[u]rban voters were only indifferently
responsive to theirs.”77 Oklahoma Democrats also seem to have framed the issues in the election
more effectively than Governor Edmondson. While the governor spoke about fairness in political
representation, a relatively abstract concern, state Democrats told rural voters that their power
would be undercut if the initiative passed, that the state constitution would be amended in a
manner contrary to the intentions of the document’s framers, and that state politics would come
to be dominated by big city interests.

3. Oklahoma, 1962 (Succeeded)

Two years later, Oklahoma’s reformers tried again. The initiative they proposed this time
differed subtly from the measure that failed in 1960, in that the 1962 initiative did not seek to
75

Otis Sullivant, State Votes No, No, No, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 21, 1960, at 1; see also Rural Vote
Emphatically No, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 21, 1960, at 27 (“Never before in the history of elections [have] such
one-sided majorities been rolled up in the rural areas. In Cimarron County, in the far end of the Panhandle,” the vote
was “1,240 votes against to a mere 5 for reapportionment.”).
76
See Rift in Oklahoma Hurts Democrats, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1960, at 55 (“Rural voters turned out in record
numbers to swamp the proposals. They were favored in the larger cities, but the majorities there were not so large as
expected and the vote was much lighter than in the rural areas.”).
77
Where There Is Light, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 22, 1960, at 18.
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change the constitutional reapportionment formula, only to enforce it by means of a
commission.78 Counties would thus not be entitled to at least one representative in the lower
chamber, nor would the cap on country representation in the lower chamber (seven) be
eliminated, if the initiative passed.79 As in 1960, Governor Edmondson backed the measure, as
did the state Republican Party80 and Oklahoma’s leading newspaper.81 In addition, both parties’
candidates for governor expressed their support for the initiative,82 and a new group called
Citizens for Constitutional Reapportionment spearheaded the signature-gathering process.83
More importantly, the judicial landscape had shifted between 1960 and 1962. In March
1962, the Supreme Court held in Baker v. Carr84 that legislative apportionment presented a
justiciable question and that electoral districts were required to have approximately the same
population. That decision sparked widespread litigation and legislation, and galvanized
supporters of redistricting reform across the country.85 In Oklahoma, a federal district court
applied Baker to the apportionment of the state’s legislature, and concluded that the entire
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The proposed Constitutional Apportionment Commission would also have been composed of the attorney general,
the secretary of state, and the treasurer.
79
See In re Initiative Petition No. 271, State Question No. 408, 373 P.2d 1017 (Okla. 1962) (holding that the 1962
initiative is “substantially different” from the 1960 initiative, and therefore not barred from the ballot by a
constitutional provision prohibiting the resubmission of an initiative within three years of its initial defeat).
80
See Apportion Drive To Get GOP Aid, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Oct. 6, 1961, at 10.
81
See At Long Last, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Nov. 5, 1962, at 28 (endorsing the reapportionment initiative).
82
See Governor Foes To Let Voters Decide Issue, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 29, 1962, at 3 [hereinafter Governor
Foes] (“Both candidates early in the campaign had declared for constitutional apportionment as a general
proposition, and each said he would call a special election on the measure if he became governor . . . .”). Governor
Edmondson was unable to run for reelection because of term limits.
83
See William Beecher, Political Upheaval? Cities To Gain Power if High Court’s Ruling Spurs Reapportionment,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 1962, at 1; see also Apportion Backers Plan Intensive Drive, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Oct. 7,
1962, at 11 (“Citizens for Constitutional Reapportionment announced Saturday an intensive and active campaign to
insure success in the November 6 election.”).
84
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
85
See Alan L. Otten, Rural Lawmakers: Rapid Reapportionment Threatens Their Hold on State Legislatures, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 9, 1962, at 1 (“With a speed and scope defying all forecasts, the Supreme Court’s landmark
reapportionment decision is revolutionizing the makeup of state legislatures.”); Layhmond Robinson, 22 States
Battle on Redistricting: Fight Spurred by High Court Ruling Is Spreading Fast, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1962, at 23
(“The politically potent issue of legislative apportionment is burning like a prairie fire across the nation. Only a
small flame in a few states some months ago, the issue has blazed to new prominence following a landmark decision
by the United States Supreme Court . . . .”).
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arrangement was unconstitutional.86 The court gave the Oklahoma legislature until March 8,
1963 to come up with an electoral regime that did not violate the Constitution, and threatened to
reapportion the legislature itself if the deadline was not met.87 The 1962 initiative campaign,
therefore, was conducted under the looming cloud of federal judicial intervention.
Because of this cloud, the tone of the campaign on both sides was muted by comparison
to the feisty 1960 confrontation. Both parties’ nominees for governor rarely discussed
reapportionment and said they would defer to the voters’ judgment.88 Oklahomans for Local
Government, the group that led the opposition to the 1960 initiative, did not organize against the
1962 measure.89 And the initiative generally was “not an issue that worked up the people as the
contesting forces did on Gov. Edmondson’s reform program, which included reapportionment, in
1960.”90
In the wake of this subdued campaign, the initiative passed by a margin of 55 percent for
to 45 percent against.91 The Supreme Court’s decision in Baker and the Oklahoma district court’s
ultimatum to the state legislature were unquestionably the most important factors explaining the
initiative’s victory. In 1960, Oklahoma’s rural voters had believed that they could prevent
reapportionment, and so had turned out in large numbers to preserve their political influence. By
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See Moss v. Burkhart, 207 F. Supp. 885 (D. Okla. 1962).
Id.; see also Court Accepts Oklahoma Promise, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 4, 1962, at 11.
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See Governor Foes, supra note 82 (“The nominees for governor are willing to let the voters make their own
decision on the initiative measure for constitutional reapportionment of the legislature.”).
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See Otis Sullivant, Reapportionment Issue Fails To Stir up Election Interest, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Nov. 2, 1962,
at 5.
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Id.; see also Otis Sullivant, Apportion Issue To Increase Vote, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 26, 1962, at 3 (“[T]he
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1962, it was clear that, one way or another, reapportionment was going to take place. Either the
legislature would act on its own, or a popular initiative would pass, or a federal court would
intercede on behalf of the principle of one-person, one-vote. The incentive to fight
reapportionment tooth and nail no longer existed, and the 1962 initiative accordingly skulked its
way to victory.92

4. North Dakota, 1973 (Failed)

North Dakota’s 1973 redistricting initiative, like the Oklahoma measure eleven years
earlier, arose in the context of litigation involving the one-person, one-vote principle. In the
1960s, courts thrice invalidated reapportionment plans drawn by the North Dakota state
legislature.93 The North Dakota district court eventually imposed its own plan in 1965, which
was notable for the multimember senate districts it created as well as the relatively large interdistrict population discrepancies that it authorized.94 After the 1970 census, the state legislature
failed to reapportion itself, and the district court struck down the existing district map—
ironically, the same one that it had fashioned itself seven years earlier—and imposed yet another
plan for the 1972 election only.95 This plan also included multimember districts and substantial
inter-district population variance.
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In 1973, the Republican-dominated North Dakota state legislature finally passed a
reapportionment plan calling for five multimember senate districts and an inter-district
population variance of 6.8 percent.96 The governor, Democrat Arthur A. Link, vetoed the plan
but had his veto overridden by a vote of 72-30 in the House and 37-14 in the Senate.97
Supporters of the governor then filed a referendum petition subjecting the legislature’s plan to a
statewide vote, and also launched an initiative to take redistricting out of the legislature’s hands
altogether. The initiative would have required all of North Dakota’s legislative districts, for both
the House and Senate, to elect only one representative, and created a bipartisan nine-member
commission to draw the district lines.98
Not surprisingly, the chief backers of the initiative were Governor Link, the state
Democratic Party, and traditional Democrat allies such as organized labor and farm
organizations.99 Democrats objected to both the boundaries of many districts, which they
contended were unduly favorable to Republican candidates, and the multimember nature of some
Senate and all House districts. According to Democrats, the latter feature allowed Republicans,
who were the majority party in most of the multimember districts, to win far more seats than they
deserved given their popular support. As the Bismarck Tribune observed, “[i]n a state which
elected a Democratic governor and lieutenant governor as well as a state treasurer and tax
commissioner, voters only elected 10 Democrats to the 51-member Senate and 22 Democrats to
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the 102-member House.”100 The other important argument of the initiative’s supporters was that
single-member districts would improve representatives’ accountability to their constituents. In
Lieutenant Governor Wayne Sanstead’s words, “[s]ingle-member districts would create lines that
would make candidates for public office come from one particular area. They would be voted on
by a smaller number of people, thus making government more responsive to the needs of that
area.”101
Opposition to the initiative was concentrated in North Dakota’s Republican Party, which
stood to lose influence if the measure passed. Republicans attacked the initiative on multiple
grounds. The state party’s chairman, Allan C. Young, declared repeatedly that the redistricting
commission would amount to “yet another bureaucracy that would be completely unresponsive
to the people of North Dakota.”102 Other prominent Republicans claimed that the creation of
single-member House and Senate districts would disrupt existing political communities and
dilute rural influence in the state legislature.103 Also leveled at the initiative were charges that it
was merely an effort by frustrated Democrats to seize a greater share of the political spoils,104
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that a new state census would be required if the measure passed,105 that the initiative “assumes
that there will never be more than two parties or two factions in the legislative arena,”106 and that
decennial redistricting might be too inflexible for a state as dynamic as North Dakota.107 Many of
these charges were echoed by the state’s two most important newspapers, the Bismarck Tribune
and the Fargo Forum, both of which opposed the initiative.108
On December 4, 1973, the initiative went down to defeat with 45 percent of the vote in
favor compared to 55 percent against. (The referendum on the legislature’s reapportionment plan
also failed by a 53 percent to 47 percent margin.) The unified opposition of North Dakota’s
majority party and media establishment was a key factor in the measure’s loss at the polls. The
initiative’s critics also made more (though not necessarily better) arguments than its supporters,
and received more attentive press coverage.109 Furthermore, Governor Link, the most important
Democrat in the state, barely involved himself in the campaign.110 Finally, voter turnout in the
election—in which the only items on the ballot were the redistricting initiative and the
reapportionment referendum—was exceptionally light, a situation that typically favors the
proponents of the status quo.111
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5. Colorado, 1974 (Succeeded)

Reapportionment consumed much of the Colorado state legislature’s calendar in 1972.
Legislators took months to come up with their initial plan,112 only to see it struck down by the
Colorado Supreme Court for violating the state constitution’s district compactness
requirement.113 The legislature’s next map was upheld in litigation,114 but attracted attention
because of the oddly shaped districts that it created. One district, according to Representative
Jerry Kopel, “looked like an equatorial line on a world globe dividing the city, with portions of
the boundaries through city parks just several yards wide.”115 That district was nicknamed the
“Bettymander” because it was designed to weaken Representative Betty Benevidez’s hold on her
seat.116
In the wake of this controversial redistricting exercise, Colorado’s League of Women
Voters proposed an initiative that would delegate district-drawing responsibilities to an elevenmember commission. The commission would include the majority and minority leaders of both
state legislative chambers, three members appointed by the governor, and four members
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appointed by the chief justice of the Colorado Supreme Court.117 It would redistrict the state
legislature every ten years, and craft districts that were compact, that preserved communities of
interest, and that deviated less than 5 percent in their population.118
The debate over the Colorado initiative was placid by comparison to the firestorms that
enveloped similar measures in other states, both before and after 1974. Good government groups
such as the League of Women Voters and Common Cause supported the initiative, but their main
argument on behalf of the measure was just that it would allow the state legislature to focus on
more important issues.119 They did not denounce the Republican Party for its 1972 gerrymander
or emphasize the inherent unseemliness of legislative redistricting. Colorado’s main newspapers
also devoted relatively little coverage to the initiative and expressed their (conflicting) editorial
positions in moderate language.120 Most surprisingly, the state’s parties and prominent politicians
were almost entirely silent about the initiative. No new organizations were formed to fight for or
against the measure, and I did not find a single newspaper article quoting the governor or any
major legislative figure about the initiative. In fact, the only reference to politicians’ views on the
initiative that I was able to find came two days before the election, and merely cited unnamed
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legislators who had “come out in opposition to Amendment 9, insisting that redistricting is a job
done best by lawmakers, using the give-and-take of the legislative process.”121
The explanation for the campaign’s strange calm—and for the initiative’s resounding 60
percent to 40 percent victory on election day—is that 1974 was not a normal year in the annals of
American politics. It was, rather, the year of Watergate and of President Nixon’s resignation, and
one of the best years ever for Democrats across the country. In Colorado, Democrats defeated an
incumbent Republican governor, U.S. senator, state attorney general, and state treasurer, while
also winning control of the General Assembly.122 The election’s dramatic pro-Democrat tilt
reduced both parties’ incentives to talk much about the initiative. Republicans, sensing imminent
electoral catastrophe, were reluctant to criticize a measure that was leading in the polls,123 and
unable to make the argument that the initiative was an effort by sore loser Democrats to seize
more political power. Democrats, on the other hand, did not need to lobby hard for a measure
that was already almost sure to pass, and were more focused on the many contested candidate
elections in 1974 than the initiative campaign. In the end, Amendment 9 cruised easily to victory
atop the year’s pro-Democrat and pro-reform tidal wave, escaping almost unscathed from the
attacks that typically befall redistricting initiatives.

6. Ohio, 1981 (Failed)
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Ohio already had a redistricting commission in place in 1981. Fourteen years earlier, the
state legislature had passed (and Ohio’s voters had ratified) a constitutional amendment
transferring redistricting authority for state elections to a five-member Apportionment Board.124
However, Republicans in the early 1980s were dissatisfied with the Board because Democrats
enjoyed a three-to-two advantage on it, and had twice used that advantage to enact pro-Democrat
redistricting plans.125 Accordingly, the Ohio Republican Party proposed a measure that would
have replaced the existing Board with a bipartisan commission made up of two Democrats, two
Republicans, and a fifth member chosen by the four partisan appointees. The new commission
would not actually have drafted district maps itself, but rather would have adopted the state and
federal plans submitted to it in which districts were most compact, as measured by the ratio of
districts’ area to their perimeter.126
Ohio Republicans and good government groups were the initiative’s main backers.
Republican Party state chairman Earl Barnes declared that “[r]egardless of whether it’s
Republican or Democratic, I think the people are getting damned tired of gerrymandering.”127
John Evans, the coordinator of the pro-initiative campaign, termed the proposal “innovative” and
stated that “[b]etter government through fair and impartial redistricting is our goal.”128
Republicans were joined in support of the measure by the League of Women Voters, Common
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Cause, and the Ohio Council of Churches.129 Together, they created a new organization, the
Committee for Fair and Impartial Redistricting, and spent around $750,000 collecting
signatures130 and $600,000 “on a media campaign aimed at discrediting the political methods
currently used for apportioning districts.”131
In opposition, Ohio Democrats accused the initiative’s backers of attempting to seize
political influence that they had been unable to win at the ballot box. James Leahy, executive
director of the state Democratic Party, scoffed that “[i]f they don’t like the game, they try to
change the rules.”132 Another Democrat official, noting that Ohio had adopted its present
Apportionment Board just fourteen years before and that Republicans had also tried and failed to
place a similar initiative on the 1980 ballot, commented that “I’m not sure how many times you
can build the ark, especially if it don’t flood.”133 Democrats also cited the likely consequences of
the initiative as evidence that it was nothing but a Republican power grab; “the plan could insure
that both of Ohio’s lost Representatives [after the 1980 census] would be Democrats. If the
initiative fails and the politically divided Legislature does the job, each party would lose one safe
seat.”134 Finally, Democrats attacked the initiative’ supporters for raising most of their funds
from large corporations, and threatened those corporations with a reduction in their political
influence if they continued their contributions.135
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On election day, Issue 2 lost with 42 percent of the vote for versus 58 percent against—a
somewhat surprising result given that Republicans controlled the state’s governorship as well as
one of the two legislative chambers. The main explanation for the initiative’s defeat was
probably the relatively tepid support that it received from the state Republican Party, compared
to Democrats’ energetic opposition.136 Governor James Rhodes was almost entirely silent on the
subject of the initiative.137 More importantly, Ohio’s Republican legislators were quite uneasy
about Issue 2, which would have required the redistricting commission automatically to adopt the
state and federal plans with the most compact districts. Compactness may be a virtue when all
else is equal, but its elevation above all other redistricting considerations—e.g. respect for
communities of interest and political boundaries, district continuity from one election to
another—posed a serious threat to all incumbent legislators, Democrat and Republican.138

7. California, 1982 (Failed)

The first of four California redistricting initiatives took place in 1982. During the
previous year’s legislative session, Democrats had pushed through a reapportionment plan that
promised to strengthen substantially their party’s hold on both the state legislature and
California’s congressional delegation.139 Republicans, furious at what they considered to be a
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blatant partisan gerrymander, initiated two direct democracy campaigns to undo the legislature’s
handiwork. First, they obtained enough petitions to subject the three reapportionment plans (for
the Assembly, the Senate, and the congressional delegation) to a statewide referendum. The
referendum occurred in June 1982, and resulted in all three plans being rejected by a 63 percent
to 37 percent margin.140
Second, state Republicans joined forces with Common Cause to draft and promote a
redistricting initiative. The initiative would have created a ten-member redistricting commission
with four members appointed by the Assembly and Senate party caucuses, two members
appointed by the major parties’ chairmen, and four members appointed by senior state appellate
judges. The commission would have been required to draw state and federal districts that were
compact, respectful of political subdivisions, and divergent by no more than 2 percent from the
average district population. Any reapportionment plan would have needed the approval of seven
commission members, including at least three of the court-appointed commissioners and one of
each party’s appointees. If the commission deadlocked, the California Supreme Court would
have appointed special masters to carry out the redistricting.141
California Republicans were the 1982 initiative’s most important backers. They spent
about $350,000 gathering signatures for the measure and another $250,000 campaigning for it,142
and also provided most of the $200,000 budget for a pro-initiative group called Citizens for Fair
Representation.143 Joining the Republicans in support of the initiative were an array of interest
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groups (e.g. Common Cause, the League of California Cities, the California Chamber of
Commerce, the American Association of University Women, the California Church Council, the
National Association of Retired Persons, and the National Association of Retired Teachers), as
well as President Reagan and former President Ford.144 The main arguments of the initiative’s
supporters were that a redistricting commission was the only way to prevent the Democrats from
repeating their 1981 power grab,145 and that legislators are intrinsically unable to separate their
personal interest from the public good during redistricting.146
California’s Democratic Party and Democratic Governor Jerry Brown—the architects of
the 1981 reapportionment—were the initiative’s principal opponents.147 Interestingly, few
interest groups joined the Democrats in opposition,148 though the Los Angeles Times did come
out against the initiative.149 Democrats spent about $250,000 campaigning against redistricting
reform,150 and made a wide assortment of claims about the initiative. Assembly Speaker Willie
Brown asserted that a redistricting commission would be just as roiled by partisan strife as the
state legislature,151 and that commissions generally work no better than legislative
redistricting.152 Assembly Democratic Caucus Leader Douglas Bosco predicted that the
144
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commission would be composed of “a bunch of old, white, upper-middle-class men,” thus failing
to reflect California’s diversity.153 And other Democrats argued that the commission would lack
accountability to the public,154 and that it would be prone to deadlock because of its peculiar
requirements for passing a reapportionment plan.155
On November 2, 1982, the initiative was defeated by a vote of 45 percent for versus 55
percent against. The measure’s backers actually spent more money and received more support
from third-party groups than the initiative’s opponents, meaning that the loud and persistent
criticism by the Democratic Party and Governor Brown was probably crucial to the measure’s
loss at the polls. As was also the case in other initiatives, the measure’s opponents seem to have
been more mobilized and more creative in their arguments than proponents of redistricting
reform, enabling them to prevail in the end despite their initially inauspicious position.156

8. California, 1984 (Failed)

After the November 1982 redistricting initiative failed, the California state legislature
passed a new reapportionment plan similar to (and just as pro-Democrat as) the one that had been
rejected by the state’s voters in the June 1982 referendum. Angry Republicans responded by
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launching another initiative, this one prescribing the actual district lines for state and federal
elections.157 The initiative was scheduled for a December 1983 vote, and both parties began
preparing for what one Democrat described as “the political fight of a generation.”158 However,
the preparations were cut short by the California Supreme Court, which ruled in September that
the initiative violated the state constitution because it would have authorized an impermissible
second redistricting during a single decade.159
Unfazed by the court’s decision, California Republicans drafted yet another redistricting
initiative for the 1984 election. This initiative would have created a redistricting commission
made up of eight retired state appellate judges, four appointed by Republican governors and four
by Democrats.160 The commission would have formulated district maps on the basis of
competitiveness, compactness, contiguity, and equipopulation, and then submitted the maps to
the electorate for approval in a statewide referendum. If the commission found itself deadlocked,
one member would have been eliminated at random to break the logjam.161
The 1984 battle lines closely resembled those from two years earlier, except that
Governor Jerry Brown, a Democrat, had been replaced by George Deukmejian, a Republican.
Governor Deukmejian led the Republican effort in support of the initiative. According to one
observer, he “devoted virtually his full-time efforts for weeks and more than $1 million in his
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personal election funds to the campaign,”162 and repeated his campaign theme, “fairness, not
politics,” at rally after rally.163 Republicans spent $1.3 million to qualify the initiative for the
ballot, and about $2 million more on advertisements on behalf of redistricting reform.164 As in
1982, President Reagan and numerous pro-business groups (e.g. the California Manufacturers
Association, the California Chamber of Commerce, the Western Growers Association) joined the
state Republican Party in support of the initiative.165
Democrats, not surprisingly, responded to the initiative by commencing “all-out warfare”
against it.166 They blasted the proposed commission for “relying on a small pool of elderly,
predominantly Republican retired appellate court judges”167 who might be influenced by
conflicts of interest,168 for creating nominally competitive districts that would actually favor the
Republican Party,169 and for reducing public input into the redistricting process.170 They raised
more than $4 million to fight the initiative,171 and won the support of the Los Angeles Times172 as
well as several groups that had largely sat out the 1982 election, such as the California AFL-CIO,
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the California Trial Lawyers Association, the Mexican American Political Association, and the
NAACP. They also mounted an extremely effective ad campaign that attacked the initiative for
involving judges in redistricting,173 and featured actor Jack Lemmon making statements like
“Proposition 39, it would make a great movie—money, power, back room deals with judges.
Ohhh. But it would make one lousy law.”174
On election day, 45 percent of the electorate supported Proposition 39 and 55 percent
voted against it. Republicans benefited relative to 1982 from the energetic support of a popular
governor. But, unlike in 1982, they were outspent by the initiative’s opponents and did not enjoy
the same unified backing from third-party groups. More importantly, Democrats appear to have
been exceptionally successful at framing the issues in the initiative campaign. Powerful antiinitiative ads swamped Governor Deukmejian’s message about fair representation, and
convinced voters that judges could not be trusted to conduct redistricting. The governor admitted
the effectiveness of the commercials a month before the election,175 and observers afterwards
concluded that “television commercials [had] a lot to do with” the initiative’s loss at the polls
because “they play[ed] not only upon people’s rational understanding of these issues but also
their emotions.”176
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9. California, 1990 (Failed)

California’s next campaign over redistricting initiatives unfolded in 1990, when two
separate reapportionment-related measures were on the ballot. The first, sponsored by
Republican businessman Gary Flynn, would have allowed the state legislature to continue
drawing district lines, but would have required a two-thirds vote by the Assembly and Senate as
well as voter approval before a redistricting plan could become law.177 The second, of more
interest here, would have created a twelve-member commission to conduct redistricting. The
commission members would have been selected by a panel of three retired state appellate judges,
and would have included five Democrats, five Republicans, and two independents. The
commission would not actually have drafted district maps itself, but would have chosen among
plans submitted to it on the basis of compactness, equal population, preservation of communities
of interest, fair representation for minorities, and competitiveness.178
The initiative’s supporters were a motley crew. The measure was announced by Paul
Gann, best known as a co-sponsor of the notorious property tax-cutting Proposition 13, Alan
Post, for three decades the state legislature’s nonpartisan budget adviser, and Ellen Elliott, a
leader of the League of Women Voters.179 Also prominent in their support for the initiative were
Leroy Heslop, former executive director of the California Republican Party,180 former President
Reagan,181 major corporations such as Chevron and Hewlett Packard,182 and a handful of
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Democrats not holding elected office.183 Unlike in 1984, however, Governor Deukmejian was
not very active in the campaign,184 and many Republican state legislators actually opposed the
initiative because they were afraid that its competitiveness requirement would imperil their seats
in addition to those of their Democratic opponents.185 Supporters of the measure spent $700,000
gathering signatures186 and close to $1 million on campaign commercials,187 some of which
featured actor Charlton Heston accusing Democrats of “conn[ing]” the public.188 The most
common arguments made on behalf of the initiative were that it would make California’s
elections more competitive,189 and eliminate districts that “look like pieces in an intricate jigsaw
puzzle.”190
California Democrats mounted a unified—and very well-funded—campaign against the
initiative. Assembly Speaker Willie Brown led the opposition (and even promised to make
legislative redistricting fairer if the initiative failed),191 while State Senator Bill Lockyer, civil
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rights leader Jesse Jackson,192 and Senate President Pro Tem David Roberti also loudly criticized
the measure. As in 1982 and 1984, Democrats accused Republicans of trying to “gain control by
line-drawing rather than by political competition,”193 and of proposing a commission that would
be dominated by special interests and “mostly old, white men.”194 The Democrats were joined in
opposition to the measure by the National Organization for Women, various Hispanic groups, the
Sierra Club, the Los Angeles Times’s editorial page,195 and, most surprisingly, Common Cause, a
prominent good government group that initially backed the initiative but later changed its
mind.196 Democrats and their allies also massively outspent the measure’s supporters, with
estimates of their expenditures ranging from $5-8 million.197 This enormous war chest was used
to fund a series of devastatingly effective commercials starring actors James Garner, Bea Arthur,
and, in a reprise appearance, Jack Lemmon.198
Both redistricting initiatives on the ballot were trounced at the polls, with Proposition 119
(which would have created the commission) winning just 36 percent of the vote. As in 1984,
Democrats’ speeches and ads convinced much of the public that the measure would have enabled
sinister special interests to seize control of the state’s redistricting process. Bob Marks, campaign
manager for the Yes-on-119 campaign, said that he knew his side was in trouble “when my
mother called me up after she saw the Jim Garner ad and said ‘Are you sure I should vote for
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this?’”199 Compared to 1984, the Democrats also enjoyed a much greater spending advantage,
more backing from third-party groups, and, critically, a fractured opposition. As noted above,
Governor Deukmejian was lukewarm in his support for Proposition 119 and many Republicans
criticized the measure. At an acrimonious party conference a month after the initiative was
defeated, conservative rebels actually submitted a resolution criticizing the “ineffectual,
incompetent, and wasteful” campaign on behalf of the measure, and asked for an audit to
“determine where the party’s money was spent and why it fumbled the campaign[].”200

10. Arizona, 2000 (Succeeded)

During the 1990s, Arizona’s state and federal elections were strikingly uncompetitive,201
and complaints were raised about the strange shapes of some electoral districts.202 In 2000, a
coalition of good government groups, the Arizona Democratic Party (long the minority in the
state legislature), and wealthy real estate developer Jim Pedersen sought to enact redistricting
reform. The initiative they drafted would create a five-member redistricting commission; state
appellate judges would select a pool of twenty-five candidates, the House and Senate majority
and minority leaders would each appoint one commission member from this pool, and the four
partisan appointees would choose a fifth individual to be the commission’s chairperson. The
199
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commission would then draft state and federal district maps on the basis of equal population,
compactness, contiguity, respect for communities of interest, preservation of political
boundaries, and competitiveness.203
The redistricting initiative, Proposition 106, was supported by an unusual mix of actors.
Arizona Democrats, not surprisingly, strongly backed the measure in hope that it would weaken
Republicans’ grip on the state legislature and congressional delegation.204 Good government
groups such as Common Cause and the League of Women Voters also endorsed the measure,
seeing it as an “antidote to Arizona's checkered redistricting history.”205 These predictable
supporters were joined by a number of prominent Republicans: former Governor Rose Mofford,
Superintendent of Public Instruction Lisa Keegan, former Attorney General Grant Woods,
Phoenix Mayor Skip Rimsza, State Representative Sue Gerard, etc.206 Almost every executive
branch official in Arizona also supported the initiative,207 and the governor, Republican Jane Dee
Hull, kept her views on redistricting reform to herself.208 Finally, Arizona’s most important
newspaper, the Arizona Republic, maintained a steady drumbeat of support for Proposition
106.209 From February 1999 through election day, the Republic published a series of editorials
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with titles such as Put the Crayons Back in the Box!210 and Stop the Music on Redistricting,211
and at one point issued a weekly “redistricting countdown” tracking the progress of the
initiative’s backers in gathering signatures.212 Proposition 106’s supporters stressed the
enormous advantage enjoyed by Arizona incumbents during the 1990s213 as well as the
unseemliness of legislators custom-designing their own districts.214
Opposition to the initiative stemmed almost entirely from Republican legislators and a
handful of pro-business interest groups. Arizona’s five Republican congressmen criticized the
measure because they believed it would “lack accountability to voters” and “prove less
representative of the state as a whole.”215 State Senate Majority Leader Rusty Bowers attacked
the initiative because, in his view, a redistricting commission would be just as political as the
legislature but less savvy and knowledgeable about the state.216 And Arizona Republican Party
chairman Nathan Sproul denounced Jim Pedersen, the largest contributor to the pro-initiative
side, and described the Proposition 106 campaign as “just a small group of special interest
individuals trying to hijack the process.”217 As mentioned above, Arizona Republicans’
opposition to Proposition 106 was less than unanimous, with several important party members
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either supporting or remaining silent about the measure.218 In addition, the initiative’s foes were
forced to raise funds from outside the state in the waning days of the campaign as they found
themselves behind in the polls and short on cash.219
In the end, Proposition 106 prevailed by a vote of 56 percent for to 44 percent against.
The most significant explanation for the initiative’s success was probably the dissension within
the Arizona Republican Party. With Governor Hull uncharacteristically taciturn and many
Republicans voicing their support for the measure, the party was unable to mount a unified
campaign in opposition. Why Arizona Republicans were so fractured, though, is a more vexing
question; legislative majorities in other states have not had nearly as much difficulty maintaining
a common front when challenged by redistricting initiatives. The answer appears to be threefold.
First, the Arizona Republic’s extraordinary campaign on behalf of redistricting reform made the
commission a major issue from early 1999 onward, and generated negative attention for all
Republicans that tried to thwart it—but praise for politicians that bucked their party on the issue.
Second, Republicans in the state legislature made the tactical mistake in 1999 of themselves
proposing a redistricting commission, albeit one that would have been staffed by six Republicans
and three Democrats.220 Because of this decision, party members found it difficult down the road
to argue that commissions were intrinsically unrepresentative and susceptible to special interest
domination. Third, it was primarily Republicans who were not legislators (e.g. mayors, state
cabinet members) that supported the initiative. These politicians had much less to lose if the
measure passed, and were also less susceptible to pressure from the party apparatus.
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11. California, 2005 (Failed)

The highest-profile redistricting initiative ever—thanks to the enthusiastic support of
Republican Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger—recently took place in California. In the 2004
general election, not a single incumbent in the Assembly, Senate, or California congressional
delegation had been beaten, and not a single seat had changed parties.221 Governor
Schwarzenegger therefore made redistricting by nonpartisan commission a central pillar of the
reform package that he pushed in 2005. He first tried to convince the Democrat-dominated state
legislature to enact his proposal.222 When this effort (rather predictably) failed, he ordered a
special election in which redistricting reform and several other measures would be put to a
statewide vote.223
Proposition 77 would have created a three-member commission to carry out California’s
state and federal redistricting. The state’s Judicial Council would have chosen at random a pool
of twenty-four retired judges, the Assembly and Senate majority and minority leaders would
each have selected three judges from the opposing party, the four legislators would then each
have vetoed one of the remaining twelve judges, and finally the three commission members
would have been picked randomly from the eight judges still on the list. The commission would
have drawn districts on the basis of equal population, compactness, contiguity, and respect for
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political boundaries, and would have been barred from considering the potential effects of
redistricting on incumbents or political parties.224
Governor Schwarzenegger was by far the most important proponent of Proposition 77.
He made redistricting reform a major issue in 2005, personally involved himself in the
initiative’s drafting, raised large amounts of money for the pro-initiative side, and campaigned
vigorously on behalf of the measure. According to Schwarzenegger, Proposition 77 would have
made California’s elections more competitive,225 helped more moderate politicians at the
expense of extremists on both ends of the political spectrum,226 and returned California to the
widely respected judge-drawn districts that the state enjoyed in the 1990s.227 Several important
organizations joined Schwarzenegger in support of the initiative, including Citizens To Save
California,228 the Rose Institute,229 Common Cause,230 and various business interests. Both the
Los Angeles Times231 and the San Francisco Chronicle232 also endorsed Proposition 77.
Together, Schwarzenegger and his allies spent approximately $5 million on advertising and other
campaign activities.233
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A coalition of California Democrats, traditionally pro-Democrat groups, and skeptical
Republicans opposed Proposition 77. Some of the most vocal Democrat critics were U.S. House
Representatives Nancy Pelosi234 and Howard Berman,235 both of whom raised significant sums
to defeat the measure. Groups that came out against the initiative included the Alliance for a
Better California,236 the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund,237 the California
Teachers Association, the California State Council of Service Employees, and other major
unions.238 Most notably, a number of prominent California Republicans publicly broke with
Governor Schwarzenegger over Proposition 77. U.S. House Representative John Doolittle
declared that “[a]s a conservative Republican, it makes me very nervous when I hear people say
that their overt objective is to remove the conservatives.”239 The national Republican Party also
opposed the initiative, and by some counts sixteen of California’s twenty Republicans in
Congress disagreed with Schwarzenegger about redistricting reform.240 The opponents of
Proposition 77 dramatically outspent the measure’s supporters.241 Their arguments focused on
the impossibility of removing politics from the redistricting process,242 the impropriety of
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conducting a second, mid-decade redistricting,243 the sense that the initiative was nothing more
than a “power grab by the party that’s not in power,”244 the difficulty of implementing the
initiative’s proposals in time for the 2006 election,245 and the fear that the national Democratic
Party would be hurt if the measure passed and California Democrats lost seats in Congress as a
result.246
Proposition 77 lost by a wide margin on election day, with 40 percent of the vote in favor
compared to 60 percent against. As in previous California initiative campaigns, the unified and
forceful opposition of the state Democratic Party framed the debate as a partisan struggle rather
than a question of good government. The measure’s prospects were also damaged by the
dissension within the California Republican Party. While almost every major Democrat loudly
criticized the initiative, many Republicans remained silent or joined the disparaging Democratic
chorus. Governor Schwarzenegger did enthusiastically back Proposition 77, but previous
California campaigns show that gubernatorial support alone does not ensure a measure’s
passage. Moreover, Schwarzenegger’s once sky-high approval ratings had plummeted by
November 2005, thus further reducing his influence over the electorate. As one observer
commented just before the election, “[t]here’s a negative drag created by Arnold that spans
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across all of the propositions that he’s supporting, and it doesn’t leave a lot of room for him to
move.”247

12. Ohio, 2005 (Failed)

The last of the twelve redistricting initiatives took place in Ohio in 2005. In the previous
year’s election, Ohio Democrats had won 49 percent of the congressional vote but just 33 percent
of the seats, 48 percent of the state House vote but just 42 percent of the seats, and 37 percent of
the state Senate vote but just 19 percent of the seats.248 Moreover, the average margin of victory
in Ohio’s state and federal races was 35 percentage points.249 In response to these perceived
electoral flaws, a group called Reform Ohio Now proposed an initiative that would have created
a new five-member redistricting commission for Ohio. Senior state court judges of different
party affiliations would have chosen the first two commission members, and those two
commissioners would have selected the remaining three members (one Democrat, one
Republican, and one independent). The commission would have adopted the state and federal
district maps that created the most competitive districts, except that plans that sacrificed some
competitiveness for greater compactness and community preservation could be chosen.250
Reform Ohio Now, the main backer of the redistricting initiative (Issue 4) as well as three
other propositions on the 2005 ballot, was a “nonprofit coalition of mostly moderate and liberal247
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leaning interests.”251 It was funded primarily by foundations and individual donors (many of
them from outside Ohio),252 and endorsed by groups such as Common Cause, the AFL-CIO and
other unions, the NAACP, and the Sierra Club.253 Ohio’s Democratic legislators were also
nominally in favor of Issue 4,254 but were not especially vocal in their support, probably because
more competitive districts would have put their own seats in play in addition to those of their
Republican opponents.255 The initiative’s backers highlighted Ohio’s history of uncompetitive
races and argued that the ethical scandals surrounding Republican Governor Robert Taft were
evidence of the need for redistricting reform.256 A typical commercial intoned that “[t]here’s a
culture of corruption in our government” and claimed that Issue 4 would “help get rid of the
special interest money, hold the politicians accountable and clean up the corruption once and for
all.”257
Ohio’s Republicans furiously opposed Issue 4, forming a new organization, Ohio First, to
direct the effort against the measure. Because of his poor poll numbers, Governor Taft kept a
relatively low profile during the campaign, but prominent legislators such as House Speaker Jon
Husted, State Senator Kevin Coughlin, and State Representative Kevin DeWine loudly
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denounced the initiative.258 Thanks to intense fundraising and support from pro-business groups
such as the Ohio Chamber of Commerce,259 opponents of Issue 4 substantially outspent the
measure’s backers.260 They used their war chest to assemble a large team of consultants
(including the producers of the anti-John Kerry Swift Boat ads) and bombard the Ohio airwaves
with critical commercials.261 The main themes sounded by the ads were that Issue 4 was put on
the ballot by “wealthy, out-of-state liberals trying to hijack Ohio’s elections,”262 and that the
initiative would transfer control of redistricting to faceless bureaucrats.263 Opponents of Issue 4
also argued that it was a mistake to privilege competitiveness above other redistricting criteria,
proving their point by producing a sample district map with “districts shaped like string beans”
that the new commission would be required to adopt because of its high competitiveness
score.264 Most of Ohio’s newspapers joined Republicans in calling for a ‘No’ vote on Issue 4.265
On November 8, 2005, Issue 4 lost with just 30 percent of the vote for compared to 70
percent against—the worst defeat of any of the twelve redistricting initiatives. Following a sort
of political Murphy’s Law, almost everything that could go wrong did go wrong for the measure.
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Issue 4’s natural supporters, Ohio Democrats, were lukewarm in their advocacy because of
concern about how their own reelection chances might be affected if the initiative passed.
Reform Ohio Now was easily dismissed as a collection of out-of-state liberals. The initiative’s
critics were well-organized and well-funded, and their media barrage was considered to have
been particularly effective. And turnout on election day was low, particularly in Ohio’s cities, as
voters confused by the complicated initiatives and reluctant to participate in a special election
stayed home.266

III. PATTERNS AND LESSONS

In seventy years of effort, four redistricting initiatives have succeeded and eight have
failed. Part II described in detail all twelve initiatives, and posited some explanations for why
each one passed or was defeated. This section considers the measures collectively rather than
individually, and attempts to reach some broader conclusions about why redistricting initiatives
succeed or fail, what reformers can do to make success more likely in the future, and how
accurately the academic literature explains the initiatives’ outcomes.

A. Patterns in the Past

Redistricting initiatives’ odds of passage are actually worse than they seem. In total, four
out of twelve have prevailed at the polls, but two of those successes—Arkansas (1936) and
266
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Oklahoma (1962)—took place before or around the time of Baker v. Carr.267 Those measures’
supporters, unlike backers of redistricting reform in the forty years since Baker, were able to
point out the obvious unfairness of electoral districts that vary widely in population. They did not
have to resort to the second-order argument that even when the one-person, one-vote principle is
respected, democratic values can still be subverted by clever district-drawing. In the post-Baker
era, only two out of nine redistricting initiatives have succeeded, compared to two out of three in
the period before the Supreme Court entered the political thicket.
As a group, the campaigns over the failed redistricting initiatives were quite different
from the campaigns over the successful measures. As Appendix B, infra, indicates, the
initiatives’ proponents were outspent in four of the seven failed campaigns for which I have
information, but had greater resources than their adversaries in the one successful campaign for
which an assessment is possible.268 The state governor twice opposed the initiative in failed
campaigns but never fought against a successful initiative. The majority party in the state
legislature strongly opposed all eight failed initiatives, but never vigorously resisted a successful
initiative. (In the three successful campaigns for which I have information, the legislative
majority party was split once and weakly opposed to the initiative twice.)269 The minority party
in the state legislature was split twice and weakly in favor thrice in the failed campaigns, but
supported all three of the successful measures for which I have information.270 In failed
campaigns, major newspapers supported the initiative twice, opposed it four times, and were split
twice, while in successful campaigns they endorsed the measure thrice and were split once.271
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Interest groups were split six times and supportive of the measure twice in failed campaigns, but
were split just once and supportive twice in successful campaigns.272 All of the successful
campaigns unfolded in the wake of a recent egregious gerrymander, and twice they took place in
the shadow of important relevant national developments; on the other hand, one of the failed
campaigns was not provoked by an especially awful gerrymander, and none of them were
accompanied by major national events.273 Finally, opponents of redistricting reform were more
effective at framing the debate in seven of the failed campaigns but none of the successful
campaigns.274
The (rather intuitive) upshot is that redistricting initiatives are more likely to succeed
when their supporters outspend and outframe the opposition, the legislative majority party is split
or weakly opposed, the governor and the legislative minority party are strongly supportive,
newspapers and interest groups endorse the measure, a blatant gerrymander has recently
occurred, and favorable developments are transpiring on the national stage. But it is possible to
advance this analysis further. First, state governors are basically powerless to get a redistricting
initiative to pass (though they may be able to accomplish the reverse, that is, to ensure a
measure’s defeat through their energetic opposition). In three cases—Oklahoma (1960),
California (1984), and California (2005)—governors made the passage of a redistricting measure
their top campaign priority, only to see those initiatives lose by an average of twenty points.
Moreover, none of the four successful initiatives enjoyed strong gubernatorial support; only
once, in Oklahoma (1962), was the governor’s favorable position clear from newspaper
coverage, and even in that campaign Governor Edmondson was a lame duck and devoted little
effort to passing the initiative.
272
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Second, the minority party in the state legislature is similarly incapable of propelling a
redistricting initiative to success at the polls. The minority party strongly supported a
redistricting measure four times275 and weakly supported such a measure five more times,276 yet
only three of those initiatives succeeded. And in the three successful cases, the minority party’s
support for the initiative was weak twice—Oklahoma (1962) and Colorado (1974)—and strong
only in Arizona (2000), a campaign in which the Republicans’ internal strife was probably more
important than the Democrats’ unified advocacy. However, actual splits in (as opposed to
lukewarm support from) the minority party correlate perfectly with defeat on election day.
California Republicans divided over the 1990 and 2005 redistricting initiatives, and those
measures lost by twenty-eight and twenty points, respectively.
Third, the actual content of a redistricting initiative also has little impact on the measure’s
fate at the polls; the eight failed proposals do not look appreciably different from the four that
passed. Oklahoma’s successful 1962 initiative, for example, was almost identical to the measure
that the state’s voters rejected in 1960. Similarly, the successful initiatives in Colorado (1974)
and Arizona (2000)—both of which created commissions that draw districts on the basis of a set
of familiar redistricting criteria—strongly resemble the failed initiatives in California (1982),
California (1984), California (1990), and California (2005). The only conclusion that can be
drawn about initiatives’ content is that relatively unorthodox proposals are certain to fail. Ohio’s
1981 initiative, which would have required the commission to adopt the plans with the greatest
district compactness, and Ohio’s 2005 initiative, which would have privileged competitiveness
above all other redistricting criteria, were defeated by an average of twenty-eight points.
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Two more factors that seem relatively unimportant in explaining initiative success or
failure are interest group positions and recent egregious gerrymanders. In most campaigns—
seven of the eleven that I was able to assess—important interests lined up on both sides of the
measure, making their overall influence a wash. In the four campaigns in which most interests
backed one side (always the pro-initiative side), the measures passed twice and were defeated
twice. And those two successes—Colorado (1974) and Arizona (2000)—were almost certainly
not attributable to interest groups’ endorsements or mobilization, which by all accounts played a
small role in both campaigns. As for glaring gerrymanders, they are unfortunately so prevalent
that they provide no meaningful distinction between successful and unsuccessful redistricting
initiatives. Seven of the eight failed initiatives took place shortly after an especially offensive
redistricting exercise, as did all four of the initiatives that prevailed.
So what factors do account for why some initiatives succeed and some fail? The most
important single variable appears to be the intensity of the legislative majority party’s opposition
to the measure. In the eight cases where the majority party strongly opposed an initiative, the
initiative failed every time. But in the four cases where the majority party’s position was unclear
or split or only weakly opposed, the initiative succeeded every time. This finding makes a good
deal of sense. Legislators from the majority party in a state are the main targets of redistricting
initiatives (as well as the primary beneficiaries of the gerrymandered status quo). They are also
members of the party that most of the electorate supports, at least in legislative elections.277 So it
is not surprising that the majority party in the state legislature vehemently opposes most
redistricting initiatives, or that those initiatives fail as a result of its strident opposition.
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But it is not just the fact of intense majority party resistance that dooms initiatives, but
also the kind of campaign that the resistance engenders. In case after case, majority party
legislators responded to a threatening redistricting measure by raising large sums of money,
campaigning furiously against the measure, and striving to frame the debate in the most
advantageous possible terms. As Appendix B shows, when the majority party strongly opposed a
redistricting initiative, it outspent the measure’s supporters four times and was outspent thrice,
and was more effective at framing the debate six times, while never allowing the other side
clearly to seize the rhetorical advantage.278 This means that strong majority party opposition
produces a political environment in which proponents of redistricting reform face almost
insurmountable obstacles. They are confronted not only by the official hostility of the largest
partisan entity in the state, but also by an anti-initiative effort that is better-funded, able to call on
more prominent politicians as spokesmen, and made up of legislators desperately fighting for
their political lives.
The deeper mystery, then, is why redistricting initiatives ever win—or, which is to say
the same thing, why the state majority party does not always strongly oppose such measures. The
answer is that while the majority party would always like to fight forcefully against redistricting
reform, forces beyond its control sometimes prevent it from doing so. In Oklahoma (1962) and
Colorado (1974), it was important national developments that interceded. The Supreme Court’s
decision in Baker v. Carr made it clear to Oklahoma Democrats that reapportionment could no
longer be resisted. Even if they thwarted both the 1962 initiative and similar proposals in the
state legislature, reapportionment would still take place, just by court decree instead of
democratic decision-making. Accordingly, the Oklahoma Democratic Party barely even tried to
fight the 1962 initiative even though two years earlier it had ferociously opposed an almost
278
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identical measure. Similarly, Colorado Republicans in 1974 recognized the threat that the
redistricting initiative posed to their dominance in the state legislature. But they also realized that
the 1974 elections, taking place shortly after the Watergate scandal, would be exceptionally
favorable to Democrats and self-proclaimed reformers. They therefore muted their opposition—
which would have been futile anyway—to the initiative, and focused on holding onto their seats.
There were no comparably important national developments in 2000, but the Arizona
Republican Party still failed strongly to oppose the redistricting initiative on the ballot.279 There
is no single explanation for the party’s halfhearted resistance; it appears, rather, to have stemmed
from an unusual confluence of factors. First, Arizona Republicans themselves had earlier
proposed a redistricting commission, making it difficult for them to argue convincingly against
the initiative. Second, a number of prominent Republican executive branch officials declared
their support for the measure, thus hampering legislators’ effort to present a vigorous and unified
opposition front. Third, and perhaps most importantly, the Arizona Republic tirelessly
editorialized in favor of the initiative and criticized the measure’s opponents. Newspapers in
other states also endorsed redistricting initiatives, but the persistence and high profile of the
Republic’s campaign were unique among the twelve cases that I examined.280
It is now possible to answer this Article’s motivating question: Why do redistricting
initiatives succeed and why do they fail? In short, redistricting initiatives generally fail because
they provoke fierce opposition from the majority party in the state legislature, which feels
threatened by the possibility of fairer district lines. The majority party typically raises more
279
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money than the initiative’s supporters, argues more creatively and vociferously for its position,
and manages to cast the debate in a light more favorable to it. On the other hand, redistricting
initiatives succeed when for some reason the legislative majority party is unable to mobilize in
opposition. Sometimes national developments such as Supreme Court decisions or political
groundswells account for this inability; sometimes local factors such as media coverage or poor
tactical decisions by the majority party are responsible. The default, unfortunately, is that
redistricting initiatives fail, and something out of the ordinary must transpire for them to prevail
at the polls.

B. Lessons for the Future

The above analysis of the twelve redistricting initiatives suggests that the situation for
would-be reformers is dire. In general, any measure that they draft—no matter how well-written,
no matter how admirable in its policy implications—will be defeated. The majority party in the
state legislature will rally against the initiative, and reformers will be outspent, outframed,
outcampaigned, and, ultimately, outvoted. It matters little whether the governor supports the
measure, whether newspapers and interest groups are in favor, or whether the existing electoral
districts undermine everything that democracy stands for. The outcome of the campaign will still
be the same: failure.
But there are a few glimmers of hope for proponents of redistricting reform. First, and
most importantly, history shows that redistricting initiatives do succeed when they are launched
at the same time that favorable national developments are taking place. The challenge, then, is to
identify propitious moments for reform in the future. Unfortunately, such moments are more
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apparent with the benefit of hindsight, but it does seem like we may currently be on the verge of
one. Thanks to the California and Ohio initiatives in 2005, the uproar over Texas’s mid-decade
redistricting, and the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Vieth v. Jubelirer281 and LULAC v.
Perry,282 redistricting is in the news more than ever before. Moreover, though it is still too early
to tell for sure, the 2006 elections look like they will be very favorable for Democrats283—who,
outside of California, have been the main supporters of redistricting reform in the modern era.
The combination of greater public awareness of redistricting abuses and a pro-Democrat political
environment may produce an unusually auspicious setting for redistricting initiatives. If current
trends hold, reformers should be sure not to let the opportunity slip away.
What happens if, as will usually be the case, there are no favorable national
developments but a redistricting initiative is nevertheless on a state’s ballot? In such a situation,
reformers should learn as much as possible from the 2000 Arizona campaign, the one modern
case in which a redistricting initiative prevailed despite the absence of any dramatic national
events. One lesson from Arizona is that reformers should try not only to win major newspapers’
endorsements, but also to garner their committed and vocal support. An unrelenting editorial
campaign on behalf of an initiative, like that mounted by the Arizona Republic in 2000, has the
capacity to focus the public’s attention on redistricting and embarrass opponents of the measure.
Media backing is especially important for proponents of redistricting reform since they are
typically at a disadvantage when it comes to conventional campaigning and television
advertising.
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A second lesson from Arizona is that it is vitally important for an initiative’s supporters
to create rifts in the legislative majority party. State legislators from the majority party are, of
course, the politicians least likely to back a redistricting measure, but they may be convinced to
do so if they hold seats that would be safe under virtually any electoral arrangement, or if they
are unusually reform-minded. Several Republican members of the Arizona state legislature, for
instance, came out in support of Proposition 106 in 2000.284 A more promising way for reformers
to sow dissension in the majority party’s ranks, though, is to target the party’s current and former
executive branch officials. Such officials have much less to lose than state legislators if
redistricting is entrusted to a neutral commission, and they are also more likely to buck the party
establishment, especially if they no longer hold elected office. The most important Republican
supporters of Proposition 106 in 2000 were all past and present executive branch officials.
A final bit of advice for reformers, derived from the failed campaigns of Ohio (1981),
California (1990), California (2005), and Ohio (2005), is that they must at all costs maintain
unity in the legislative minority party. In those four races, whatever hopes the initiatives’ backers
had were dashed by tepid support from, or outright splits in, the minority party.285 Unfortunately,
the best way to prevent minority party defection is for reformers to propose measures that are
unthreatening to minority party politicians—and hence less likely to produce genuinely fair
district maps. The common theme in the four cases above is that each measure would have
imperiled the seats not only of majority party legislators, but also of many minority party
politicians. The 1981 Ohio initiative would have made district compactness the sole redistricting
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criterion; the 1990 California initiative would have required the commission to consider district
competitiveness when choosing among plans; the 2005 California initiative would have barred
the commission from examining the party affiliations or voting histories of the electorate; and the
2005 Ohio initiative would have made competitiveness the most important factor in redistricting.
Reformers, then, should avoid proposing schemes that promise to change most districts’ shapes
(as the 1981 Ohio initiative would have), or to make reelection more difficult for minority party
legislators (as the other three measures would have). The proposals that are left may seem
watered-down, but they would still dramatically improve the status quo—and, crucially, have a
prayer of passing.
In sum, the playbook for advocates of redistricting reform should read as follows: Wait
for favorable national developments to take place, and launch redistricting initiatives in their
wake. If a measure is not buoyed by important national events, try to win the enthusiastic support
of major newspapers, to peel off some members of the legislative majority party in the state, and
to avoid proposals that are overly threatening to minority party legislators’ job security. Even if
all these goals are met, of course, the initiative may fail. But at least reformers will have learned
the right lessons from the few successful initiative campaigns, and avoided repeating all the
mistakes of the eight failed campaigns—not one of which featured a unified minority party, a
divided majority party, and support for the measure from the state’s media establishment.

C. Implications for the Academic Conventional Wisdom

Section II.A, supra, presented the variables that, according to political scientists, best
explain the outcomes of popular initiatives. These variables include campaign spending,
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especially when deployed against a measure; voters’ appraisal of a measure’s merits; the
positions taken by elites, in particular interest groups and the media; and the framing of a
measure by its supporters and detractors. On the other hand, political scientists tend to downplay
the importance of political parties, arguing that parties rarely take positions on initiatives and that
voters in initiative elections are deprived of the partisan cues that assist their decision-making in
candidate elections.286 How accurate is the academic conventional wisdom on initiative
outcomes (at least in the redistricting context)?
Not very. First, several of the factors identified as significant by political scientists are
unhelpful in explaining why redistricting initiatives succeed or fail. For instance, initiative
supporters outspent opponents in at least four campaigns but prevailed in only one of those
cases.287 (Though, as scholars would expect, every time that a redistricting measure’s opponents
were better-funded, the measure was defeated.) Initiatives’ merits also could not have played too
large a causal role since all twelve of the measures were relatively similar—seeking to combat
gerrymandering by creating redistricting commissions that would draw district lines on the basis
of specified criteria—but their fates at the polls diverged widely. As noted above, the Oklahoma
(1960) and Oklahoma (1962) initiatives were almost identical, but the former passed while the
latter was defeated; and the successful initiatives in Colorado (1974) and Arizona (2000) closely
resembled the four failed California initiatives. Interest group and media positions seem
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See supra note 50. The scholarly consensus on political parties is not absolute, though. Regina Branton, for
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process, the data show that parties are highly adaptable organizations, making selective use of initiative campaigns
as part of their set of political tools.”).
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See infra Appendix B. In the one campaign where a redistricting initiative’s supporters clearly outspent its
opponents, Oklahoma (1962), the extra funding was almost certainly not decisive. As discussed above, see supra
Part II.B.3, the Supreme Court’s one-person, one-vote decision earlier that year was the most important reason why
that measure passed.
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relatively unimportant as well, since initiatives usually fail even when strongly backed by major
groups and newspapers. Arizona (2000) is the only case where media support for a measure was
an important reason for success at the polls, and it must be weighed against Oklahoma (1960),
Ohio (1981), California (1982), and California (2005), all cases where initiatives were defeated
despite strong interest group and newspaper backing.
Not only are the variables identified by political scientists unable to explain the outcomes
of redistricting initiative elections, but the most important causal factor—the position of the
legislative majority party, and the intensity with which it is held—is one that the academic
literature typically neglects. This Article’s analysis of the twelve redistricting initiatives shows
that the measures universally failed when they were strongly opposed by the majority party in
the state, and universally succeeded when the majority party was split or only weakly opposed.
This finding would come as a complete surprise to observers such as Cronin, Magleby, Gerber,
and Lupia, all of whom argue that the absence of obvious partisan cues in initiative elections
deprives parties of their usual electoral clout.288 These scholars (along with most of the political
science establishment) believe that parties do not matter in initiative elections, but not only do
parties matter in the redistricting context, they matter more than any other variable.
There are three reasons why the academic conventional wisdom is so wrong about
redistricting initiatives. First, and most importantly, redistricting initiatives are fundamentally
different from other exercises in direct democracy because they are designed to upset the
political balance of power. Political scientists may be right that parties do not get too exercised
over fiscal or environmental or legal initiatives, but it stands to reason that they will be far more
involved in campaigns over measures that could sharply enhance or undercut their political
prospects. Other interest groups also have less at stake in redistricting initiative elections,
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meaning that it is easier for parties to assume the lead role in the debate. Second, political
scientists are inclined to minimize the relevance of political parties across all initiative contexts.
If this perspective is flawed and parties are generally more influential than was previously
thought to be the case, as some recent evidence suggests,289 the error will be especially severe in
the arena where parties have the most to gain and lose. Third, no political scientist has ever
conducted a detailed analysis of all the redistricting initiatives that have taken place over the
course of American history. (Nor, to be fair, has anybody else.) But without such an analysis it is
impossible to assess accurately the importance of political parties in redistricting initiative
elections—especially since party positions and the manner in which they influence campaigns
are not very susceptible to quantification and statistical study. This Article’s methodology, and
the unexpected results it produced, thus suggest a need for more case study-style investigations
of popular initiatives (and other political science phenomena as well). Case studies tend to be
more laborious to generate than multiple regressions, but they can also reveal insights that are
otherwise lost in the statistical fog.

CONCLUSION

This Article has sought to answer two questions about redistricting initiatives, which after
Vieth and LULAC represent the only realistic way to curb political gerrymandering. First, are
redistricting initiatives (and the redistricting commissions they invariably seek to create) a good
idea? Second, and more importantly, why do redistricting initiatives generally fail, and what can
reformers do to improve such measures’ odds of success in the future? Part I made the case for
289
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redistricting initiatives and redistricting commissions. Redistricting initiatives unblock stoppages
in the democratic process, thereby allowing the public to enact electoral reform over the
opposition of self-interested legislators. And redistricting commissions are in theory better suited
to district-drawing than state legislatures, and empirically have produced more competitive
elections and more representative results.
Part II, the heart of the Article, first discussed a series of variables that might be expected
to influence initiative outcomes. The section then examined in detail the twelve redistricting
initiatives that have taken place over the course of American history. For each initiative
campaign, the measure’s supporters and opponents (as well as their principal arguments) were
described, and tentative explanations for the measure’s eventual success or failure were
proposed. Part III, finally, considered the twelve redistricting initiatives holistically in search of
broader explanations for their outcomes and lessons applicable to future campaigns. The
section’s main finding was that, contrary to the academic conventional wisdom, redistricting
initiatives always fail when they are strongly opposed by the majority party in the state
legislature. If reformers are to have any hope of success, they need to find some way—e.g.
capitalizing on favorable national developments, winning the enthusiastic support of a state’s
media establishment, sowing dissension between the majority party’s executive branch officials
and its legislators—to defuse majority party opposition.
This finding is especially ironic because it undermines one of the central premises of
direct democracy: that it enables the people to bypass the legislature and enact desired policies
despite the politicians’ resistance. If redistricting initiatives fail when they are strongly opposed
by most legislators, and succeed when they are not, then they seem to be no different from
conventional legislation. There are, however, two characteristics of redistricting initiatives that
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distinguish them from regular bills and make them (slightly) more likely to become law. First,
they may be (and usually are) placed on the ballot by groups other than state legislators. This
means that redistricting reform may become a major political issue even when there is nothing
that elected officials would rather talk about less.
Second, redistricting campaigns have a way of unfolding unpredictably. Polls gyrate up
and down, media barrages shift public opinion back and forth, party fissures are revealed and
then healed, national developments intercede, etc. The outcome in the end may usually be defeat
for the pro-initiative side, but there is at least more volatility, and hence more hope, in initiative
campaigns than in state legislative chambers. Proponents of redistricting reform, then, should not
yet conclude that the direct democracy game is not worth the candle. The odds of success for
redistricting initiatives are low—but they are not zero, and they are higher than the probability of
meaningful legislative or judicial action.
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APPENDIX A: FEATURES OF THE TWELVE REDISTRICTING INITIATIVES
State

Year

Outcome

Level

Redistricting Criteria

Commission Composition

Arkansas

1936

Yes

State

Oklahoma

1960

No

State

Three members: governor, secretary of
state, and attorney general.
Three members: attorney general, treasurer,
and secretary of state.

Oklahoma

1962

Yes

State

North Dakota

1973

No

State

Commission draws districts with equal population that are
contiguous and do not divide counties.
Commission enforces standards already in Oklahoma
constitution; each county guaranteed one House member;
ceiling on House members per county eliminated.
Commission enforces standards already in Oklahoma
constitution; constitutional formula is unchanged.
Commission draws single-member districts with equal
population.

Colorado

1974

Yes

State

Ohio

1981

No

State and federal

California

1982

No

State and federal

Commission draws districts while considering equal
population, compactness, and respect for political boundaries.

California

1984

No

State and federal

California

1990

No

State and federal

Arizona

2000

Yes

State and federal

Commission draws districts while considering
competitiveness, compactness, respect for political
boundaries, and equal population.
Commission chooses among submitted plans, on basis of
equal population, minority group power, respect for county
boundaries, compactness, contiguity, respect for political
boundaries, and competitiveness.
Commission draws districts while considering equal
population, compactness, contiguity, preservation of political
boundaries and communities of interest, and competitiveness.

California

2005

No

State and federal

Ohio

2005

No

State and federal

Commission draws districts while considering equal
population, compactness, contiguity, and preservation of
political boundaries and communities of interest.
Commission chooses among submitted plans, on basis of
district compactness.

Commission draws districts while considering equal
population and minimization of county and city splitting, and
ignoring party affiliations of voters.
Commission chooses among submitted plans, on basis of
competitiveness.

Three members: attorney general, treasurer,
and secretary of state.
Nine members: two each picked by Senate
majority and minority leaders, and House
majority and minority leaders; the eight
then pick the ninth, who is the chairman.
Eleven members: four picked by legislature,
three by governor, and four by judiciary.
Five members: two Democrats, two
Republicans, and a fifth member chosen by
the first four.
Ten members: four selected by appellate
judges, four selected by Senate and
Assembly party caucuses, four selected by
party chairmen.
Eight members: all retired judges selected
by lottery, four from each major party.
Twelve members: ten from major parties
and two independents, picked by judges.
Five members: appellate court picks
twenty-five candidates; state legislature
leaders pick four commissioners; those four
pick chair.
Three members: retired judges chosen by
legislature leaders through complicated
formula.
Five members. two chosen by sitting
judges; those two then pick remainder.
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APPENDIX B: FACTORS IN REDISTRICTING INITIATIVES’ SUCCESS OR FAILURE
State

Year

Outcome

Vote

Side
spending
more

Governor
position

Strength of
governor’s
position

Legislature
majority
party
position

Strength of
legislature
majority
party
position

Legislature
minority
party
position

Strength of
legislature
minority
party
position

Arkansas
Oklahoma
Oklahoma
North Dakota
Colorado
Ohio
California
California
California
Arizona
California
Ohio

1936
1960
1962
1973
1974
1981
1982
1984
1990
2000
2005
2005

Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No

66-34
35-65
55-45
45-55
60-40
42-58
45-55
45-55
36-64
56-44
40-60
30-70

Unclear
Unclear
For
For
Unclear
For
For
Against
Against
Unclear
Against
Against

Unclear
For
For
For
Unclear
For
Against
For
For
Unclear
For
Against

Weak
Strong
Weak
Weak
Weak
Weak
Strong
Strong
Weak
Weak
Strong
Weak

Unclear
Against
Against
Against
Against
Against*
Against
Against
Against
Split
Against
Against

Weak
Strong
Weak
Strong
Weak
Strong
Strong
Strong
Strong
Weak
Strong
Strong

Unclear
For
For
For
For
For*
For
For
Split
For
Split
For

Weak
Weak
Weak
Strong
Weak
Weak
Strong
Strong
Weak
Strong
Weak
Weak

State

Year

Outcome

Vote

Editorial
position of
most
newspapers

Interest
group
positions

Recent
egregious
gerrymander

Major
relevant
national
developments

More
effective
framing

Arkansas
Oklahoma
Oklahoma
North Dakota
Colorado
Ohio
California
California
California
Arizona
California
Ohio

1936
1960
1962
1973
1974
1981
1982
1984
1990
2000
2005
2005

Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No

66-34
35-65
55-45
45-55
60-40
42-58
45-55
45-55
36-64
56-44
40-60
30-70

For
For
For
Against
Split
Split
Against
Against
Split
For
For
Against

Unclear
Split
Split
Split
For
For
For
Split
Split
For
Split
Split

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No

For
Against
Unclear
Against
Unclear
Against
Against
Against
Against
For
Unclear
Against

* Control over the Ohio state legislature was split in 1981, with Democratic control of the House and Republican control of the Senate.
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